CHAPTER 191
INSURANCE FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM
By Robert J. Rhee *

________________
SCOPE OF CHAPTER
This chapter discusses insurance case law arising from acts of terrorism,
including those arising from the September 11 attacks. It analyzes the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), as amended by the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2005 and the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, as well as the
administrative program created by the legislation. Examples are
provided and NAIC Policyholder Disclosure Notice forms are included.
Policy considerations surrounding TRIA are also discussed including
insurance industry strategies, the difficulties of assessing terrorism risks,
the effect of TRIA subsidized insurance on the market, and the benefits
and problems such subsidized insurance engender.
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§ 191.01
[A]

Terrorism Risk
Insurance Paradigm Before September 11, 2001

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the insurance industry
did not consider terrorism as a special risk in the nature of natural catastrophes
such as earthquakes and hurricanes, or potentially large scale events like a
nuclear disaster. For these exceptional risks, insurers typically charge a
separate premium or exclude the risk altogether, because the risk is either
considered too great to underwrite or too correlative to effectively spread it.
The conventional wisdom in the insurance industry was that terrorism posed a
discrete risk of low intensity, high visibility violence, the type of risk that
insurers could easily assume. Terrorism was unique, perhaps from the
standpoint of a media event and public shock, but not so much different from
other ordinary fortuitous events from the standpoint of insurance underwriting.
Before September 11, the paradigm cases of terrorism were the killing of
Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 1988 bombing of
Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Consistent with this assumption, the
actuarial and pricing models did not consider terrorism as an extraordinary risk
in the same category of nuclear contamination, war loss, or earthquake loss for
which either the risk is excluded or additional premiums are collected. 1
Insurers implicitly covered terrorism risk in most “all risk” policies because
they did not specifically exclude it.2 Nor did reinsurers specially carve out the
risk in their treaties. Insurers considered the risk to be so small that it was
covered for “free.”3
These actuarial assumptions continued as terrorism was slowly brewing
into a major problem over the course of several decades. The 1990s ushered in
See, e.g., Cal.— Int’l Dairy Eng’g Co. of Asia v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 352 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Certain risks are considered so high that, without an additional
premium, insurers regularly exclude them, e.g., the war risk loss and nuclear hazard
exclusions. 352 F. Supp. at 828. Without an additional premium, most policies exclude risks
of loss due to war and nuclear, biological or chemical contamination.
See also N.Y.—Zen Cont’l Co. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
2
U.S.— City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2003).
An “all risk” policy covers all contingencies except those specifically excluded. 352 F.3d at
41.
3
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Terrorism Insurance: Implementation of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, at 5 (2004).
See, e.g., N.Y.—Four Times Square Assocs., LLC v. Cigna Invs., Inc., 306 A.D.2d 4,
5, 764 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2003) (“all risk” policies included acts of terrorism since terrorism was not
specifically excluded).
See also Dan L. Crippen, Cong. Budget Office, A CBO Study: Federal Reinsurance
For Disasters 11 (2002) (“Prior to September 11, terrorism insurance was provided only
implicitly; that is, most existing policies did not explicitly include or exclude losses from
terrorism.”); Dan Miller, Report to the Joint Econ. Comm. of U.S. Congress, Economic
Perspectives on Terrorism Insurance 3 (2002) (most policies “automatically covered” from
terrorism).
1
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the era of catastrophic terrorism, with the phenomenon first taking root in
Western Europe. Arguably the first catastrophic, non-airline related terrorist
act occurred when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombed London on April
21, 1992, causing $671 million in insurance losses.4 Subsequently, on February
26, 1993, Islamic terrorists bombed the World Trade Center and caused losses
of $725 million.5 On April 24, 1993, IRA terrorists again bombed London and
caused $907 million in losses.6 On April 19, 1995, American terrorists bombed
the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and caused $145 million in
losses.7 On June 15, 1996, IRA terrorists bombed Manchester, UK, and caused
$744 million in losses.8 In hindsight, these events formed a consistent trend
that would culminate in the September 11 attacks.
In a prescient assessment, Swiss Re wrote in 1993: “A single bomb
attack can kill thousands of people, cause several billion dollars of damage and
paralyse entire branches of industry. . . . [and] lay entire cities to waste.” 9 And,
in a 1999 report, the U.S. Commission on National Security chillingly warned
that “Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.”10
Contrary to popular belief, the attacks of September 11 did not beget a new
awareness of catastrophic terrorism risk. Scholars and policymakers warned of
such risks before and industry leaders were aware of the potentially massive
exposure to terrorism long before al Qaeda acquired its infamy.11 In the years
before September 11, the insurance industry considered many eventualities. In
fact, insurers considered as “possible” an airplane crashing into a building in a
high density urban center but dismissed the risk as not “probable.”12
This account is not to suggest that September 11 should have been
expected. The losses from September 11 were many folds more severe than the
largest previous loss from terrorism. Without previous experience to verify or
validate an extrapolation of then existing data, the insurance industry would
have had to overcome the natural tendency of humans to discount to virtually
zero the possibility of a remote risk.13
4

Auriela Zanetti et al., Swiss Re, Sigma No. 1/2002, Natural Catastrophes and ManMade Disasters in 2001: Man-Made Losses Take on a New Dimension, at 17 tbl. 4 (Thomas
Hess ed., 2002) (indexed to 2001 value).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Swiss Re, Terrorism and Insurance 3 (1993).
10
U.S. Comm. On Nat’l Sec., 21st Century Nat’l Sec. Study Group, New World
Coming: American Security in the 21st Century 4 (1999) (commission chaired by former U.S.
Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart).
11
See Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Public Policy Monograph, Terrorism Insurance
Coverage in the Aftermath of September 11th, at 7 (2002) (“extreme terrorist events have had
a certain amount of theoretical attention in academia”); The U.S. Comm. on Nat’l Sec., 21st
Century Nat’l Sec. Study Group, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,
at 4 (1999).
12
Munich Re, 11 September 2001 11 (2001).
13
See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 168 (2004) (noting “the
inability of many, maybe most, people, much of the time, to respond rationally to very-lowprobability risks”).
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[B]

Attacks of September 11 and Their Aftermath

The attacks of September 11 are unprecedented in insurance history. In a
single series of attacks, al Qaeda terrorists killed approximately 3000 people,
displaced over 1025 businesses employing more than 75,000 people, disrupted
another 18,000 businesses employing 563,000 people, 14 inflicted about $36
billion in insured losses,15 and another $50 billion more in uninsured losses.16
These figures do not include the indirect economic costs stemming from the
attacks, which struck at a time when the country was experiencing an
economic slowdown after the collapse of the internet and technology market
bubble. September 11 was not only the largest terrorist attack in history in
terms of economic loss, but it was also the largest single event insurance loss.
Almost immediately, there were questions whether the insurance industry
would invoke the war loss exclusion found in most policies.17 The invocation
of the war and sovereign act exclusions would have been plausible because
there was a perception of a close connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban
government of Afghanistan, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in the country and
perhaps had financial, governmental and policy dealings with al Qaeda. It is
unclear how successful this argument would have been. The factual case would
have been complex and difficult to make, and ultimately insurers would have
faced highly skeptical jurors and judges who probably would not have been
able to fully disassociate their deliberation from the national crisis at hand.
Perhaps more significantly, however plausible the legal strategy may
have been, at least in terms of the isolated legal issue of contract interpretation,
an industry-wide denial of claims would have been a highly risky business
strategy. There would certainly have been a massive political and public
backlash that ultimately would have extracted legal, political, and reputational
costs far greater than the insurances losses. And, it would have been untenable
to lobby for new legislation, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(“TRIA”), that the insurance industry believed it would need to limit exposure
to catastrophic terrorism.
Given these realities of practical politics, insurers made the right business
decision under the circumstances and quickly announced that the industry
would not invoke the war loss exclusion. 18 Indeed, the insurance industry

14

Lloyd Dixon & Rachel Kaganoff Stern, RAND Institute for Civil Justice,
Compensation for Losses from the 9/11 Attacks 15, 103 (2004).
15
Peter R. Orszag, Federal Reinsurance for Terrorism Risks: Issues in Reauthorization,
Congressional Budget Office Paper, 1 (Aug. 2007).
16
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Catastrophic Insurance Risks: Status of Efforts to
Securitize Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risk 1 (2003) ($80 billion).
17
Doyle McManus & James Gerstenzang, America Attacked: The Political Response,
L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 2001, at A1.
18
See, e.g., After the Attack: “Act of War” Exclusion Doesn’t Apply to Attacks,
Insurers Say, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 2001, at C3; Tom Hamburger & Christopher Oster,
Insurance Industry Backs U.S. Terrorism Fund, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A3.
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associated a certain degree of patriotism with its coverage decision.19 However,
insurers made the concession with the caveat that they could dispute ordinary
coverage issues. These cases produced a volume of litigation and case law, the
most important surrounding the insurance coverage of the World Trade
Center,20 which was significantly underinsured from the perspective of total
loss.21
Historically, the industry reacts to an event shock by withdrawing from
the market. The last such shocks were Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the
Northridge earthquake in 1994, which precipitated a withdrawal from the
market by reinsurers. This in turn led to dramatic price increases in the short
term,22 but as the industry recapitalized the market eventually went into a soft
price cycle for much of the 1990s. In the case of September 11, Secretary of
Treasury Paul O’Neill summarized the economic reality of the situation:
“Because insurance companies do not know the upper bound of terrorism risk
exposure, they will protect themselves by charging enormous premiums,
dramatically curtailing coverage or—as we have already seen with terrorism
risk exclusions—simply refusing to offer the coverage.”23
After an industry shock, the first to exit the market are reinsurers.
Reinsurance provides additional capital to insurers and thus increases
underwriting capacity. Because reinsurers are unregulated, they can enter and
exit markets at will. In the case of 9/11, reinsurers bore the majority of the
losses.24 Unlike primary insurance policies which are renewed throughout the
year, reinsurance treaties are typically renewed on a January-July insurance
cycle. As much as 70% of reinsurance treaties came up for renewal during the
19

Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, The Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance
Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 821, 828 n.41 (2003) (noting
the testimony of Ronald E. Ferguson, Chairman, General Re, that he was “proud of the way
[the insurance industry] stepped up to the losses of September 11th without complaint”).
20
See § 191.02[B] below (discussing September 11 related insurance case law).
21
The World Trade Centers were insured for $3.55 billion per occurrence. See Dixon
& Stern, note 14 above, at 103 (stating the replacement value estimated at $4.5 billion, and
contents at $5.2 billion). See Mark Hamblett, Industry Lawyers Argue WTC Was
Underinsured, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 2004, at 1 (noting that lawyers for insurers argued the
World Trade Center was underinsured).
22
See Crippen, note 3 above, at 3 (“[R]einsurance rates rose 75% between January
1992 and July 1994.”).
23
Terrorism Risk Insurance, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001).
24
See Miller, note 3 above, at 4 (noting that about 25% of the global reinsurance
capital was wiped out in assuming a burden of 60% to 80% of the insurance losses). European
and Bermuda based reinsurers took the brunt of the losses: Munich Re ($1,959 million), Swiss
Re ($1,777 million), Allianz ($1,335 million), ACE ($559 million). Oxford Metrica, A
Shareholder Value Analysis of the Global (Re)insurance Industry 22 (2003); R. Glenn
Hubbard & Bruce Deal, Analysis Group, The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in
Terrorism Risk 18 (2004) (providing similar loss figures); Howard Kunreuther & Erwann
Michael-Kerjan, Insurability of (Mega-) Terrorism Risk: Challenges and Perspectives, in
Recent Trends in the Catastrophic Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Market, in The OECD
Conference on Catastrophic Risks and Insurance (Nov. 22, 2004) (noting that 9/11 losses
covered by 150 insurers and reinsurers, with reinsurers being responsible for about 67% of the
losses).
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January 2002 reinsurance cycle, most of which were not renewed. 25 As
expected, when a majority of the reinsurance treaties came up for renewal in
January 2002, they were not renewed as to terrorism coverage.26
Without reinsurance, insurers could not limit the exposure to severe
liability and had no choice but to exclude coverage. Insurers filed new
exclusions with individual state regulators. Every state approved the new
terrorism exclusion language, except for California, Florida, Georgia, New
York, and Texas, which collectively accounted for about 35% of the
commercial market.27 The new exclusion broadly defines terrorism as the use
of force that has the effect or intent to coerce a government or civilian
population; and terrorism coverage is limited to losses that are $25 million or
less with exclusions for losses exceeding this amount.28 The exclusion places
terrorism risk squarely on the shoulders of commercial policyholders and their
financiers.
Reduced capacity to underwrite terrorism risk and high premium levels
for such coverage led to difficulties in transferring and spreading risk. Unless
required by financial covenants or commercial lease terms, few policyholders
bought terrorism coverage. The new pricing of terrorism coverage and costbenefit perceptions of policyholders could have led to a perception of adverse
selection. Those perceived to be most at risk (e.g., policyholders and financiers
of trophy properties) were the most likely to purchase terrorism coverage, if
such coverage was available, while lower risk policyholders would have
chosen to forego expensive coverage for a minute risk of an extreme event.
September 11 disrupted the insurance market, and specifically the ability
to transfer and spread terrorism risk. There was a perception that the temporary
dislocation of supply and demand of insurance contributed to a slowdown in
the national economy. In addition to the direct losses caused by the attacks and
the immediate consequences on the airline, hotel and tourism industries, high
premiums would have had a trickle down effect on the rest of the economy.
Higher financing costs would have also led to higher cost of goods and
services, resulting in higher prices and reduced profits. 29 One should note,

25

Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential
Economic Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters. & the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th
Cong. 4 & n.2 (2002) [hereinafter Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing].

Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, note 25 above, at 2. See also Miller, note 3
above, at 4 (stating that reinsurance treaties were not renewed in January 2002); Congress
Needs to Act Fast to Avert Insurance Crisis, Newsday, Dec. 5, 2001, at A40 (“About 70
percent of reinsurance contracts expire at [month’s end], and reinsurers are threatening not to
renew them.”).
27
See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Exclusion of Terrorist-Related Harms from Insurance
Coverage: Do the Costs Justify the Benefits?, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 397 (2003) (discussing the new
terrorism exclusion).
28
See Am. Acad. of Actuaries, note 11 above, at 14–15 (quoting the new war and
terrorism risk exclusions filed by ISO on behalf of the insurance industry).
26

29
Terrorism Risk Insurance, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (“[I]ncreased premiums and/or
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however, that since only a little more than a year passed before the enactment
of TRIA, which was signed on November 26, 2002, it is difficult to gauge how
much costs in increased premiums and cost of capital have actually flowed
down to the economy as a direct consequence of the insurance market
dislocation as opposed to the economic dislocation of the terrorist act itself.
Nevertheless, the inability to obtain terrorism risk coverage did adversely
and substantially affect the real estate and financing industries. The lack of
coverage and higher premiums increased the cost of capital and restricted
capital flow to the real estate and construction sectors.30 Approximately $15
billion to $17 billion worth of commercial real estate loans, “representing
about 10% of the CMBS [Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities] market,”
were suspended or cancelled due to terrorism risk and the inability of
businesses to transfer the risk.31 Commercial mortgage backed securities saw a
decline in overall credit rating and prices,32 and borrowers faced the possibility
of default and loan recalls due to covenants requiring insurance coverage.33
Lenders refused to finance billions of dollars of construction projects without
terrorism coverage, resulting in significant job losses in the construction and
real estate industries in an economy that was already sliding into a recession.34
In short, 9/11 caused substantial short-term economic damage on a
national level. The insurance market was perceived to be unstable in the shortterm, causing price and capacity dislocation, adverse selection of risk,
concentrated risk, economic slowdown, and significant job losses. Of
particular concern was the real estate and construction industries, which

increased risk exposure for businesses . . . will be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher product prices, transportation costs, energy costs and reduced production.”).
30
See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, note 25 above, at 2 (“[S]ome sectors of the
economy—notably real estate and commercial lending—are beginning to experience
difficulties because some properties and businesses are unable to find sufficient terrorism
coverage, at any price.”); Miller, note 3 above, at 1 (“As a result, a significant barrier to
economic activity has been created, as businesses are forced to bear higher costs of insurance
or are unable to conduct business due to financing requirements to carry terrorism
insurance.”).
31
Miller, note 3 above, at 14 & n.70 ($17 billion); THE CATO INST., POLICY FORUM,
INSURING AGAINST TERROR: IS THERE A ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT REINSURANCE? 24 (2002) (citing
$15 billion in 17 states); President George W. Bush, Address on the Signing of the Terrorism
Insurance Act (Nov. 26, 2002) (citing $15 billion).
32
See Daniel B. Rubock, CMBS World, Moody’s Update on Terrorism Insurance, 48
(2003) (downgrading 11 deals); Am. Acad. of Actuaries, note 11 above, at 6 (lenders reluctant
“to finance projects of $100 million or more” and to invest in single asset CMBS bonds).
33
See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, note 25 above, at 11.
34
See Gary Embleton & Kelley Bernal, Gen Re Facultative Matters, Terrorism—To
TRIA . . . and Beyond 2 (2004) (stating lenders held up approximately $17 billion of
construction projects for lack of terrorism coverage); see also Rising Uninsured Exposure
Hearing, note 25 above, at 9 (“Some examples of large projects canceling or experiencing
delays have surfaced, with the lack of terrorism coverage being cited as a principal
contributing factor.”); Alison R. Orlans, Terrorism Insurance and Commercial Real Estate: The
New Frontier, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 93, 94 (2003) (noting that more than $11.7 billion of real
estate projects were delayed or cancelled).
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experienced slowdown and financing problems. In the midst of this perceived
temporary economic turbulence, the government enacted the TRIA.35
[C]

September 11 Victim Compensation Fund

Within days of the attacks, the government enacted the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.36 Among other things, this
statute created the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The Fund has
been described as a “political compromise” that balanced the desire to provide
generous compensation to a large number of 9/11 victims, many of whom had
no or little life insurance, for the quid pro quo of limiting the liability of the
airline industry.37 The statute required that a claimant under the Fund must
“waive the right to file a civil action (or be a party to an action) in any Federal
or State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001.”38
Compensation under the Fund was variable, and the main components
were an award for economic loss, an award for noneconomic loss, and
collateral source offsets. Economic loss was calculated based on a number of
factors, including present and future income, and age. Noneconomic loss was a
flat $250,000 per victim killed, plus an additional $100,000 per spouse and
dependent child. Lastly, the statute provided that collateral sources, such as life
insurance and governmental benefits, offset the award of compensation.
In the end, 2879 claims out of 2976 deaths (representing 97%) were
filed.39 The Fund paid out on average of $2.08 million per claim, with a total
payout of approximately $5.13 billion. 40 Victims received on average $3.1
million, with 69% coming from the Fund, “23[%] from insurance, and 8[%]
from charity.”41
§ 191.02

Insurance Case Law Arising from Acts of Terrorism

The following section discusses selected American state and federal case
law on coverage issues concerning acts of terrorism. With a few exceptions,
most cases arising out of September 11 applied New York insurance law. The
35

See President George W. Bush, Address on the Signing of the Terrorism Insurance Act
(Nov. 26, 2002) (“[T]he Terrorism Risk Insurance Act will permit many construction projects
to move forward and to help this economy grow.”).
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSA), Pub. L. No. 10742, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). The statute was enacted on September 22, 2001.
37
See Dixon & Stern, note 14 above, at 20–21.
38
49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003). Some have suggested that the airline industry was the
primary beneficiary of the fund’s provision that tort claims must be waived. Saul Levmore &
Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 286 (2003). See
George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 527, 529 (2003) (criticizing the fund on the basis that “it lacks any
internal rationale of definition or constraint” found in the systems of compensation provided
in society).
39
Dixon & Stern, note 14 above, at 24–25.
40
Dixon & Stern, note 14 above, at 25.
41
Dixon & Stern, note 14 above, at xxiii.
36
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discussion in this section does not cover international cases, and foreign or
domestic resolutions in extra-judicial proceedings. Because large scale
terrorism has not historically been a problem in the American modern era,
there are few pre-September 11 cases discussing insurance coverage issues
triggered by acts of terrorism. The few published opinions, however, are a help
in understanding coverage issues in cases of terrorism.
[A]

Non-September 11 Related Insurance Case Law
[1] Sovereign Act and War Exclusions

In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., the Second
Circuit analyzed the coverage issue associated with the destruction of a
commercial airline on September 6, 1970, by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 42 The insured, Pan American, had policies
from a consortium of insurers covering “all physical loss of or damage to the
aircraft,” except for any loss resulting from certain specified exclusions. The
three exclusions were:
1. “damage to or destruction thereof by any Government or
governmental authority or agent (whether secret or otherwise) or
by any military, naval or usurped power, whether any of the
foregoing be done by way of requisition or otherwise and whether
in time of peace or war and whether lawful or unlawful”;
2. war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection
or warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not;
and
3. strikes, riots, civil commotion43
Upon a bench trial, the federal district court found that none of these
exclusions applied to the destruction of the airplane, and thus it held that the
insurers failed to meet their burden of showing that the loss fell within the
specified exclusions.44
The insurers first argued that, under exclusion (1), the airplane was
destroyed by a “military . . . or usurped power,” which they argued means “an
organized force defying the general enforcement of the laws by force of
arms.”45 The court found that the PFLP “occupied” ground in Jordan at the
sufferance of the Jordanian government, and that such occupation was
insufficient to constitute a military or usurped power. 46 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the findings of fact. It reasoned that “to constitute a
military or usurped power the power must be at least that of a de facto
government.”47 The PFLP was not a de facto government in the sky when it
42
43
44

505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
505 F.2d at 994.
Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D.N.Y.

1973).
45
46
47

505 F.2d at 1009.
368 F. Supp. at 1129-30.
505 F.2d at 1009.
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hijacked the airplane. Thus, the exclusion for “military . . . or usurped power”
did not apply.
The insurers next argued that the “war” exclusion should apply. The
Court of Appeals noted “war” in insurance terminology “refers to and includes
only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments at least de
facto in character.”48 The court reasoned that a terrorist group “must have at
least some incidents of sovereignty before its activity can properly be styled
‘war.’”49 The evidence showed that the PFLP was not a sovereign or quasisovereign state, or accorded such status by sovereign states in the Middle East.
Thus, the court did not find a sufficient nexus between the PFLP and a
sovereign state or entity.50
Lastly, the insurers argued that the terrorist act fell within the exclusion
for riots and civil commotion. Riots and civil commotions are purely domestic
disturbances.51 A civil commotion refers to disorders “such as occur among
fellow citizens or within the limits of one community.”52 A riot, on the other
hand, “occurs when some multitude of individuals gathers and creates a
tumult.”53 The Court of Appeals held that a terrorist act, committed by foreign
terrorists such as the PFLP, is neither a civil commotion nor a riot.
The Pan Am case is relevant to a situation where loss from terrorism can
be characterized as a sovereign act and an act of war. In fact, the insurance
industry could have argued that the September 11 attacks should have been
excluded under the “war” exclusion of all risk policies, though terrorism risk
was otherwise covered in all risk policies. Unlike many terrorist groups, which
are stateless and have little, if any, official recognition by other states, al Qaeda
was headquartered at the time in Afghanistan and, by many accounts, had a
close relationship with the Taliban government. A case could have been made
that al Qaeda was a quasi-sovereign entity or de facto branch, perhaps a
paramilitary arm, of the Afghani government. Obviously, this argument would
have required extensive findings of facts on the nature of the relationship
between al Qaeda and the Taliban, and there would have been no guarantee
that the argument would have succeeded.
If the issue was submitted to a jury as a question of fact, as it most
certainly would have been, insurers would have had a difficult challenge of
persuading a jury to deny coverage in a time of national crisis. Rather than
pursue a legal strategy that would have alienated the insurance industry,

48

505 F.2d at 1012. The court noted that a war can exist between quasi-sovereign
entities, and that undeclared de facto wars may exist between sovereign states. 505 F.2d at
1013 (citing Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. Reliance Insurance Co., 291 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1961); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946)).
49
505 F.2d at 1012.
50
505 F.2d at 1015. “The loss of the Pan American 747 was not caused by any act that
is recognized as a warlike act. The hijackers did not wear insignia. They did not openly carry
arms. Their acts had criminal rather than military overtones. They were the agents of a radical
political group, rather than a sovereign government.” Id.
51
505 F.2d at 1019 (citing Rogers v. Whittaker, 1 K.B. 942 (1917)).
52
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53
505 F.2d at 1021.
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insurers quickly announced that they would not invoke the war exclusion.54
There were many factors that led to that decision. Certainly, patriotism was a
factor.55 Beyond the visceral emotional aspect of the decision, the insurance
industry surely considered the devastation to goodwill and public reputation if
it systematically had tried to avoid liability. The exercise of the litigation
option would have also undermined a broader legal-political strategy that
culminated in the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 and
its subsequent amendments.
That insurers chose not to invoke the war and sovereign act exclusions in
the case of September 11 does not mean that the war and sovereign act
exclusions are irrelevant in future cases of terrorism. The United States
government continues to refer to the problem of terrorism as a “global war
against terrorism.” This “war” has been characterized in military terms as one
of amorphousness and asymmetry. From a legal perspective, this
characterization is also apt. The “war” is unlike the traditional sovereign-tosovereign warfare seen throughout much of history. Yet, it is not an extensive
criminal law enforcement effort either. There is a heavy military aspect to
fighting terrorism. While this “war” is not the traditional kind, insurers can still
make the case that the conflict to quell global terrorism such as violent Islamic
movements resembles more war than criminality for the purpose of insurance
coverage and exclusion.
In this regard, there is a connection between the risk and the exclusion.
As seen in the case of September 11, a great national tragedy may put
significant public and political pressure on the insurance industry that is
outside of the consideration of the legal issues. The legal risk is only one factor
in the overall business risk. On the other hand, small scale events, which are
more typical of acts of terrorism, are less susceptible to the forces of public and
political opinions. In these matters, a lawyer advising a client must have a
sense of the politics of terrorism and the situation since terrorism insurance is
unique in this sense. Unlike most coverage issues in insurance, the coverage of
terrorism goes beyond the four corners of the contract. Any terrorist act on the
homeland again will strike a raw nerve on the public and political conscience.
As a matter of practical politics, there may be significant media and political
coverage of a small scale event, but such coverage may not extend to the
technical details of insurance coverage and exclusion. In this sense, the legal
issues associated with smaller events are less susceptible to being “distorted”
by politics and public perception. As the losses get bigger, and the harm to the
American psych becomes greater as well, the insurance industry may find it
again difficult to rely on the war and sovereign act exclusion. The same
problem of practical politics and industry goodwill will come to bear.
54

After the Attack: “Act of War” Exclusion Doesn’t Apply to Attacks, Insurers Say,
L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 2001, at C3; Tom Hamburger & Christopher Oster, Insurance Industry
Backs U.S. Terrorism Fund, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A3.
55
See Christian Brauner & Gedrges Galey, Swiss Re, Terrorism Risks in Property
Insurance and Their Insurability After 11 September 2001 15 (2003) (stating that excluding
coverage “could be interpreted as terrorists’ victory over society and hence of the free
democratic system”).
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Additionally, there will be a few other complications as well. Obviously, the
industry set a prior precedent of not invoking the exclusion in the case of
September 11. And, if the exclusion is invoked, any hope of renewing the
Program or making it permanent would disappear. For these reasons, one
would expect that the coverage and exclusion decision would reach the CEO
and Board levels of most insurers.
Moreover, the relative risks must be considered. In the context of
terrorism risk in general, there is a low risk of an attack from a terrorist group
that is clearly associated with a foreign government.56 A sovereign deemed to
be responsible for or complicit in such an attack would risk open armed
conflict with the United States. This is a highly unlikely situation as it may be
tantamount to a sovereign’s declaration of war against the United States. Like
most attacks in the past, a terrorist would likely come from a stateless
organization with loose ties to states. Therefore, while the sovereign act and
war exclusions are not entirely irrelevant to coverage of terrorist related losses,
an insurer seeking to invoke these exclusions faces steep factual, legal and
political hurdles.
[2] Physical Loss and Proximate Cause
In New Market Invest. Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., the issue was
whether the policy covered only physical loss directly caused by a terrorist
attack.57 In early March 1989, the United States Embassy in Chile received
several anonymous phone calls, threatening that shipments of Chilean grapes
were deliberately tainted with cyanide. The caller said that the fruit was
poisoned in order to protest the plight of the Chilean poor and to bring
economic injustice in Chile to the attention of the United States and the world.
Subsequently, one of the policyholder’s shipments of grapes was discovered to
have been contaminated with cyanide. The FDA issued a press release and
implemented prophylactic procedures, including the destruction of grapes that
entered the United States, and enhanced inspection of grapes at ports. These
developments ultimately resulted in substantial losses for the policyholder.
Much of the fruit spoiled, was destroyed by the FDA, was damaged by
inspection, or made unsalable due to the public crisis; and the policyholder also
gave credits to some of its customers who were unable to sell fruit that had
already been delivered to them.58
At issue was the insurance cover, which provided: “destruction of, or
damage to, the property insured directly caused by vandalism, sabotage, or
malicious act . . . carried out for political, terroristic or ideological purposes.”59
The policyholder argued that it suffered losses as a proximate result of
56

For example, the United States has designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a
terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224. See Robin Wright, Iranian Unit to Be
Labeled “Terrorist”: U.S. Moving Against Revolutionary Guard, Washington Post, at A1
(Aug. 15, 2007).
57
774 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
58
774 F. Supp. at 912.
59
Id. (emphasis added).
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terrorism, and the insurer argued that only the shipment of actually tainted
grapes by terrorists were covered as a physical loss. At trial, the jury found that
all of the policyholder’s loss was proximately caused by terrorism. 60 The
district court upheld the jury’s verdict upon the insurer’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.61 It reasoned that “physical damage”
(i.e., damage from cyanide) was not a prerequisite. It noted that other
provisions of the policy, not relevant to the loss here, referred to “physical loss
or damage.”62 The court found that “the parties knew how to limit coverage to
physical damage or physical loss where that was their intent.”63 Thus, the most
reasonable interpretation of the provision at issue was that physical damage
was not a prerequisite to coverage.
The insurer also argued that terrorism was not the proximate or efficient
cause of the policyholder’s loss. In instructing the jury, the court explained:
The defendant claims that the acts of terrorism were not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss.
Defendant takes the position that losses were proximately
caused by the orders and the press release of the Food and Drug
Administration and it also claims that the losses being claimed by
the plaintiff in this case are excluded under the terms of that
endorsement, that section that excludes delay and loss of market.
***
Now, I’m going to tell you how the law defines proximate
cause; particularly proximate cause in connection with insurance.
It means the predominant and determining cause. It’s also
been defined as the real efficient cause. Those words are
interchangeable and also I want to tell you that the cases say the
proximate cause is not necessarily that cause which is nearest in
time to the damage, but rather proximate cause is the one cause
which is the predominant or efficient cause.64
Based on this instruction, the jury found proximate cause in favor of the
policyholder, and upon motion the court found no error in its instruction and
upheld the finding of fact.65
The New Market case shows that losses from terrorism need not be
physical losses “directly” (in the sense of immediate proximity between act
and loss) connected to a violent act. The terrorist tactic targeted economic
harm rather than physical harm. Economic terrorism is a foreseeable evolution
of terrorist tactics. Violence is not the end of terrorists, but only a means
towards coercion. As security measures are hardened around borders and soft
target assets, economic terrorism may become a new weapon of coercion. For
example, it is within the realm of the foreseeable that on the day after
60

774 F. Supp. at 913-14.
The policyholder also moved for a new trial on damages only, and the district court
denied the motion. 774 F. Supp. at 918.
62
774 F. Supp. at 914.
63
Id.
64
774 F. Supp. at 915.
65
Id.
61
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Thanksgiving, traditionally the busiest shopping day of the year, terrorists
would coordinate a series of bombings in under-secured shopping malls, thus
devastating the retail shopping season for many companies and damaging the
national economy.66
Interestingly, as discussed later in this chapter, the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 can be construed to address only losses arising from acts
of violence or destruction. The attacks of September 11, while unprecedented,
were simply an extension of the terrorists’ tactics previously in use. Rather
than small artillery rockets or a car bomb, terrorists hijacked commercial
airlines, a common tactic, and deployed them as larger scale explosives against
a civilian population. The act still fits within the existing paradigm of violence.
The next paradigm shift in terrorism may entail economic terrorism and chaos,
though how such attacks may be executed is anyone’s guess at this point in
time.
[3] Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In Nichols v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., the federal district court
addressed on summary judgment the issue of whether uninsured motorist
policy covered the policyholder from loss incurred in the April 19, 1995,
Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. 67 The
policyholders claimed that the axel of the truck containing the bomb landed on
their car and caused damage. Following Oklahoma law, the district court set
forth a four-part test: (1) whether the injury arises out of the use of a motor
vehicle, (2) whether there is a causal connection between the use of the vehicle
and the injury, which requires findings that the use of the vehicle was
connected to the injury and that the use related to the transportation nature of
the vehicle, (3) whether an intervening force severed the causal connection,
and (4) whether the uninsured was an owner or operator of the vehicle during
the commission of the wrongful act.68 The court held that while the bombing
could be broadly construed as the use of a motor vehicle, the plaintiff could not
as a matter of law establish that the use was related to the transportation nature
of the vehicle.69 Moreover, the court also found that the connection between
the transportation use of the vehicle and the injury, if any, was severed by the
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“The impact of any act of terrorism on the economy cannot be underestimated. For
instance, a terrorist attack in the Mall of America or a Walmart superstore would probably
have a relatively small impact on the insurance losses, but it would have a significant shortterm effect on retailers throughout the nation.” Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11
Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Action, 37 Ariz.
St. L.J. 435, 437 n.4 (2005). See also John Kimelman, Wall Street Assesses Terrorism: Is the
Overall Risk Reflected in Market?, Int’l Herald Trib., Aug. 4, 2003, at 10 (“‘Imagine a person
going into a shopping mall or movie theater with a bomb. That could paralyze the economy.’”)
(quoting Kari Bayer Pinkernell of Merrill Lynch).
67
948 F. Supp. 988 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
68
948 F. Supp. at 990-91 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688
(Okla. 1990)).
69
948 F. Supp. at 991.
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criminal act of the terrorist.70 Thus, the policyholders could not recover under
uninsured motorist coverage.71
[4] Subrogation and Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
the Federal District Court determined whether a foreign sovereign, the state of
Libya, could be held liable under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
(“FSIA”) for acts of terrorism to the insurer as subrogee.72 In a previous case, a
jury found Pan Am and the security firm responsible for handling luggage
liable for the 270 deaths in the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland.73 In a separate criminal proceeding, a Libyan intelligence agent was
convicted for his role in the bombing.74 Subsequently, the insurer of the airline
and the security firm sued Libya to recover approximately $500 million in
compensation to victims and defense costs. Ordinarily, FSIA provides foreign
sovereigns immunity from lawsuit in the United States unless the action falls
within specified exceptions. 75 The statute provides an exception for acts of
terrorism. 76 This exception applies if (1) the foreign state was a designated
state sponsor of terrorism when the act occurred, (2) the plaintiff afforded the
foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the dispute if the act
occurred within the foreign state’s territory, and (3) either the claimant or the
victim was a United States national when the act occurred. 77 The federal
district court held that FSIA provides subject matter jurisdiction for an action
70

948 F. Supp. at 992.
In Mayer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
addressed the same issue and decided similarly that the requisite connection between the loss
and the use of the truck as a transportation vehicle was missing. 944 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1997).
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of the bomb. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998),
aff’g 995 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
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2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46657 (D.D.C. 2007).
73
The Second Circuit affirmed the jury verdict. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie,
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A special panel comprised of three Lords Commissioners of Scotland’s supreme
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28 U.S.C. § 1604.
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against a foreign sponsor of terrorism for acts of terrorism in an action brought
by the insurer subrogee, and that an insurer subrogee could assert state
statutory and common law claims against a foreign sovereign.78
[B]

September 11 Insurance Case Law
[1] World Trade Center

Although the insurance industry chose not to invoke the war exclusion to
avoid wholesale coverage, insurers raised ordinary coverage issues in
connection with the attacks of September 11. The attacks against the World
Trade Center in particular led to a series of complex insurance litigation in
federal court resulting in published opinions. The plaintiffs were various
entities controlled by real estate developer Larry Silverstein, who earlier in
2001 signed 99-year leases for the World Trade Center Complex from the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. Over 20 individual insurance
companies had signed binders that obligated them to provide property
coverage. The litigation produced several published judicial opinions. The
crucial question in the litigation was whether the attacks against both twin
towers were a single occurrence or two separate occurrences.79 The resolution
of the legal question determined whether the policyholder was entitled to an
approximately $3.5 billion payout, or a payout up to $7 billion.80
The plaintiff’s filed a motion for summary judgment against Travelers
Indemnity before the federal district court. 81 Unlike the three insurers,
Travelers bound coverage under its binder, and not the form provided by the
insurer broker Willis of New York (“WilProp”). The plaintiffs argued that,
because Travelers did not define the term “occurrence” in its binder, it agreed
to be bound by the meaning given to that term in New York case law, and that
such law defines occurrence as the “immediate, efficient, physical, proximate
cause of the loss, not some indirect or more remote cause of causes.”82 The
district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that
“none of the relevant cases compels a finding that the term ‘occurrence’ has
such an unambiguous meaning that, in its search for the truth, justice should
blind itself to the wealth of extrinsic evidence concerning the parties’
intentions that is available in this case.”83 Thus, the court concluded that there
were genuine issues of material facts and denied summary judgment.
78

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46657, at *8-15.
Other issues involved the obligation of insurers to pay for defense costs. See In re
September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases, 458 F. Supp. 2d 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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It was undisputed that the attacks caused losses greater than $3.5 billion. The World
Trade Center was underinsured at the time of the attacks. See Steven Brill, After: How America
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Confronted the September 12 Era 156, 389 (2003) (replacement value estimated at $5 to $6 billion);
Dixon & Stern, note 14 above, at 103 (stating the replacement value estimated at $4.5 billion, and
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SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd v. World Trade Center Prop., LLC, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9966 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9966, at *7.
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2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9966, at *16.
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The federal district court separately ruled on motions for partial summary
judgment filed by three insurers, Hartford Fire Insurance, Royal Indemnity,
and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance.84 These insurers argued that they signed
the WilProp binders, 85 and that the WilProp form contained a definition of
“occurrence” under which the attacks against the World Trade Center was a
single occurrence. There was no genuine dispute of material facts that each
insurance company bound itself to the WilProp form only.86 Only one of the
many insurers that bound coverage had issued a final policy at the time of the
attacks.87
The WilProp form contained the following definition of occurrence:
“‘Occurrence’ shall mean all losses or damages that are attributable directly or
indirectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses will
be added together and the total amount of such losses will be treated as one
occurrence irrespective of the period of time or area over which such losses
occur.” 88 In interpreting this language, the court cited the principle that
insurance policies should be construed according to the ordinary meaning of
the language.89 It held that as to the WilProp form the “ordinary businessman
would have no doubt that when two hijacked planes hit the Twin Towers in a
sixteen minute period, the total destruction of the World Trade Center resulted
from ‘one series of similar causes.’”90
The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment to
the insurers.91 The court agreed that, under the summary judgment standard,
the plaintiff and the three insurers (Hartford, Royal and St. Paul) intended the
binders to incorporate the terms of the WilProp form.92 It also agreed that no
reasonable person could find that the attacks against the World Trade Center
were two separate occurrences rather than a single, coordinated plan of attack
constituting a “series of similar causes” under the term of the WilProp form.93
84

SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd v. World Trade Center Prop., LLC, 222 F. Supp. 2d 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
85
A binder is “a short method of issuing a temporary policy for the convenience of all
parties, to continue until the execution of the formal one.” 222 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (quoting
Lipman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 24 N.E. 699 (N.Y. 1890)).
See N.Y.—Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 384
N.E.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. 1978) (binders serve as a “quick and informal device to record the
giving of protection pending the execution and delivery of a more conventionally detailed
policy of insurance”).
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222 F. Supp. 2d at 390-98.
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345 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
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222 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
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222 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing National Screen Serv. Corp. v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 364 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1966)).
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222 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
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345 F.3d at 170.
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345 F.3d at 180. With respect to the Travelers case, the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s ruling that the meaning of “occurrence” in the Traveler binder was
sufficiently ambiguous under New York law to preclude summary judgment. 345 F.3d at 190.
See note 90 above.
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For most insurers, summary judgment was not possible because two
major issues remained unresolved: (1) whether the parties actually bound to the
WilProp form, (2) whether they intended to bind coverage based on a
definition of occurrence that contemplated a one- or two-occurrence treatment
of the attacks of September 11. The district court held a two-phase jury trial. In
Phase I, 12 insurers and 20 Lloyd’s of London syndicates participated, while
six other insurers chose not to participate because they conceded that their
coverage was not governed by the WilProp form. A jury determined that all
but three of the insurers who participated in Phase I bound coverage to the
WilProp form that contemplated a single occurrence treatment of the attacks.
In Phase II, the jury determined that the three remaining insurers and the six
insurers who did not participate in Phase I bound coverage to contracts that
contemplated a two-occurrence treatment. The district court entered judgment
according to the jury’s findings.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of
judgment.94 As to the appeals from both Phase I and II of the trial, the court
upheld the jury’s findings of facts, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and its
jury instructions.
[2] Subrogation
In Industrial Risk Ins. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., the Second Circuit
considered whether the property insurer, as subrogee of a World Trade Center
building lessee, has a cognizable claim against the owner and sublessee for
gross negligence in maintaining a large stock of diesel fuel in 7 World Trade
Center. 95 The federal district court dismissed the action pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) on the ground, among others, that the lease between the lessee and the
sublessee mutually released each other from liability, and each party agreed to
obtain insurance that accepted the mutual releases and waived subrogation
rights. 96 Subrogation waivers reflect the intention of the parties to seek
recovery of losses from their insurers, and such contracts between
sophisticated parties are typically upheld. 97 The Second Circuit upheld the
judgment of the lower court on the issue of waiver of subrogation.98
[3] Business Interruption
In Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indust., Inc., the Second Circuit addressed
the issue of whether an insured contractor that provided janitorial and HVAC
service in the common and tenanted areas of the World Trade Center, and
occupied office space there, was covered for business interruption under its

U.S.—SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., LLC, 467 F.3d 107 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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U.S.—493 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2007).
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387 F. Supp. 2d at 312-13.
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493 F.3d at 287.
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policy.99 The policy covered loss or damage to “real and personal property,
including but not limited to property owned, controlled, used, leased, or
intended for use by the Insured.”100 The business interruption coverage term
(the “BI” coverage) provided coverage for “loss resulting directly from the
necessary interruption of business caused by direct physical loss or damage,
not otherwise excluded, to insured property at an insured location.” 101 The
policy also had a contingent business interruption term (the “CBI” coverage)
that extended coverage to actual losses sustained “due to the necessary
interruption of business as the result of direct physical loss or damage of the
type insured against to properties not operated by the Insured which wholly or
partially prevents any direct receiver of goods and/or services from the Insured
from accepting the Insured’s goods and/or services.”102 The CBI coverage had
a sublimit of $10 million per occurrence, whereas the BI coverage had no limit.
The insurer argued that only the CBI coverage applied and sought a
declaration that liability for business interruption was limited to $10 million. It
argued that the policyholder did not have an ownership or tenancy interest in
the WTC complex to trigger the BI coverage. The court rejected this argument.
It noted that the “real property” was defined not only by property “owned” or
“leased,” as indicated by the qualifying phrase “but not limited to,” but the
definition also included property “used” or “controlled” or “intended for use”
by the policyholder. 103 The Second Circuit reasoned that the policyholder
“used” and “controlled” the common areas and the premises that it cleaned as a
part of its contracting service: “These areas and premises were the means by
which [the policyholder] derived its income and were as essential to that
function as [its] cleaning tools.” 104 Because the policyholder “used” and
“controlled” the WTC complex, it was entitled to BI coverage.105
The court next addressed the argument that the activities of “used” and
“controlled” over the World Trade Center did not create a legally cognizable
insurable interest in the property. The New York insurance statute provides
that an insurable interest can be “any lawful and substantial economic interest
in the safety or preservation of property from loss, destruction or pecuniary
damage.”106 The insurable interest in this circumstance was not simply the real
property interest, but also included the economic value of the future income
stream that would be threatened by damage or loss to the real property. This
was implicit in the insurance contract that defined real property in a way that
extended beyond ownership and leasehold. The court ruled that the
U.S.—397 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’g Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100
397 F.3d at 162 (emphasis added).
101
Id. (emphasis added).
102
Id. (emphasis added).
103
397 F.3d at 165.
104
397 F.3d at 165-66.
105
The court also held that the CBI coverage does not operate. CBI coverage is
triggered when there is “direct physical loss or damage of the type insured against to
properties not operated by the Insured.” The court held that through its activity of
maintenance and upkeep the policyholder operated the WTC complex. 397 F.3d at 168-70.
106
N.Y. Ins. L. § 3401.
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policyholder’s income stream is dependent upon the common areas and leased
premises in the WTC complex, and thus met New York’s requirement of an
insurable interest.107
In Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., the Second
Circuit addressed whether business interruption coverage extended to the time
a policyholder could resume a functionally equivalent operation to that of the
store that was destroyed during the September 11 attacks.108 Under New York
law, business interruption coverage is triggered when there is a total
interruption or cessation of operations.109 The policyholder was a chain of drug
stores whose most profitable store was located in the main concourse of the
World Trade Center. The policy provided that the Restoration Period for
business interruption coverage “shall not exceed such length of time as would
be required with the exercise of due diligence and dispatch to rebuild, repair, or
replace such property that has been destroyed or damaged.”110 The policy also
had an Extended Recovery Period clause, which provided additional coverage
for the event that the policyholder continues to suffer losses due to its business
interruption after it reopens the damaged or destroyed store. This clause
guaranteed the policyholder its pre-September 11 profits until the earlier of
when the policyholder can restore business at the WTC store to the condition it
would have been in had the attacks not occurred or 12 months after the
Restoration Period ends.111 Based on these terms, the insurer paid 21 months of
lost profit: 9 months to relocate the store, and another 12 months of extended
recovery coverage. The policyholder argued that coverage should be extended
to the actual time period required to restore a store at the WTC site and that the
restoration period “is coterminous with the time necessary to rebuild the
complex which will replace the World Trade Center.”112 After a bench trial,
the federal district court issued a declaratory judgment holding that the
business interruption coverage must continue for the hypothesized time to
rebuild the store and “resume functionally equivalent operations in the location
where its WTC store once stood.”113
The Second Circuit held that the lower court erred in construing the
policy to provide coverage until the business can be resumed at the same
location. The use of “functionally equivalent operations” language would
enhance the business interruption coverage in such a way that the enhancement
107

397 F.3d at 167-68. The Second Circuit also reversed the District Court’s ruling that
the civil authority provision, which provides coverage when “access to real or personal
property is impaired by order or action of civil or military authority,” did not apply. The
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397 F.3d at 171.
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411 F.3d 384 (2005).
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411 F.3d at 387.
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N.Y.—Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 235,
239 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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would make superfluous the Extended Recovery Period coverage. Functional
equivalence would simultaneously terminate both the Restoration and
Extended Recovery Periods, and thus the declaratory judgment failed to
harmonize the Restoration and Extended Recovery Periods. Moreover, the
lower court’s interpretation would extend coverage beyond the time limit of
the Extended Recovery Period if the policyholder cannot achieve functional
equivalence, a consequence that the parties did not intend based on the
language of the policy.114 The court held that “coverage extends only for the
hypothetical time it would reasonably take Duane Reade to ‘repair, rebuild, or
replace’ its WTC store at a suitable location.”115 The court modified the district
court’s declaration to read (modifications in italics):
On their face, the Restoration Period clauses envision a
hypothetical or constructive (as opposed to actual) time frame for
rebuilding, repairing, or replacing, as evidenced, for example, by
their use of the subjunctive “would.” Moreover, what is to be
hypothesized is the time it would take to rebuild, repair, or replace
the functional equivalent of the store Duane Reade lost, not the
WTC complex that once surrounded it. Once Duane Reade could
resume operations in a permanent location reasonably equivalent to
the site of its former store at the WTC, the Restoration Period
would be at an end. Any losses continuing beyond that point would
be addressed by the “Extended Recovery Period” provision in the
Policy, not by the Restoration Period clause.116
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., the Second Circuit addressed
whether a commercial airliner can recover for its lost earnings caused by the
national disruption of flight service and the government’s temporary shutdown
of an airport.117 The policyholder claimed business interruption losses from its
facilities at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport when the airport was
shutdown for several weeks in the immediate aftermath of September 11. Only
the Pentagon was attacked on that day in Washington, and the airline’s
facilities there did not incur any physical damage. The policy provided:
“[insurer] will indemnify [policyholder] for property damage, loss of gross
earnings, and extra expense in excess of the Deductible . . . resulting from
[terrorism], and any ensuing fire damage, damage from looting, or other
damage caused by an act of a lawfully constituted authority for the purpose of
suppressing or minimizing the consequences of [an act of terrorism].”118 In
affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer, the
114

411 F.3d at 394.
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829 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2007) (holding that business interruption loss was limited to the period it
would have taken a reasonable retailer to resume operations in a different location).
117
U.S.—439 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’g United Airlines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 385
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439 F.3d at 129. A subsequent section provides that the policy “insures against loss
resulting directly from the necessary interruption of business caused by damage to or
destruction of Insured Locations resulting from Terrorism.” Id.
115

21-65

Second Circuit held that business interruption coverage does not apply unless
there was physical damage to the airport facilities.119
The policy also provided coverage “when access to the Insured Locations
is prohibited by order of civil authority as a direct result of damage to adjacent
premises.”120 The court held that, although the Pentagon and the airport were
in close geographical proximity (on the order of several miles), the attacks
against the Pentagon did not constitute physical damage to an “adjacent
premise” and that the airport was not shut down “as a direct result of damage
to” the Pentagon.121 Thus, the airline could not recover on the mere basis that
an order of a civil authority caused the loss.
In Philadelphia Parking Auth. v. Federal Ins. Co., the federal district
court considered under Pennsylvania law whether purely economic losses were
recoverable under the business interruption provision of the policy at issue.122
The plaintiff, who operated parking garages at the Philadelphia International
Airport, incurred economic losses arising from the temporary flight restrictions
imposed after September 11. The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the
plaintiff suffered no direct physical loss. The policy provided: “We will pay for
loss of Business Income and Extra Expense which you incur due to the actual
interruption of your operations during the period of indemnity. This actual
interruption of your operations must be caused by direct physical loss or
damage caused by a covered cause of loss.” The court held that this provision
does not support a claim for economic loss that is not supported by some
physical problem with the covered property.123
[4] Obligation to Obtain Terrorism Insurance
In Omni Berkshire Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, the plaintiff borrowed
$250 million, which was secured by five hotels. 124 The credit agreement
required the plaintiff to obtain “comprehensive all risk insurance” on the
collateral, but did not define this term. Before September 11, “all risk” policies
included terrorism risk at no additional premium. After the attacks, however,
terrorism risk became a separate coverage, and premiums were expensive. The
119

439 F.3d at 131. The court noted that dust and ash from the attacks against the
Pentagon did not constitute physical damage to the airport.
See N.Y.—Abner, Herrman & Brock, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 351,
336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that civil authority provision providing coverage “when a civil
authority prohibits access to your premises” does not extend to the circumstance where
vehicular traffic was restricted in Lower Manhattan but access was still available).
N.Y.—N.Y. Career Inst. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 3d 734, 791 N.Y.S.2d 338
(2005) (holding that coinsurance provision of business interruption policy applies to loss
caused by action of “civil authority”).
120
439 F.3d at 129.
121
439 F.3d at 134-35.
122
N.Y.—385 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The plaintiff also argued that it was
entitled to coverage under the civil authority provision of the policy. But the court held that no
civil authority prohibited access to the plaintiff’s garages and that the government’s order
pertained only to all aircraft operators. 385 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
123
385 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
124
N.Y.—307 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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plaintiff had difficulty obtaining separate terrorism risk coverage. It received a
reasonable quote of $316,000 for a $60 million cover of the five hotels, but this
premium was approximately 63% of the cost of the plaintiff’s all risk policy.125
The plaintiff filed suit, seeking a determination that it was not required under
the credit agreement to purchase terrorism insurance. After a bench trial, the
federal district court found that the parties did not intend to freeze the meaning
of “all risk” to the time when the credit agreement was signed, i.e., 1998 when
“all risk” implicitly included terrorism risk.126 Instead, the parties intended “all
risk” to mean “what the industry generally accepted—knowing that the
generally accepted all risk policy might evolve over time.”127 However, the
court also found that the creditor could require the debtor to obtain insurance
under the “other reasonable insurance” term of the agreement.128 It found that
“in the post-9/11 world when so much more is at risk, it was reasonable for
Wells Fargo to request, on behalf of its certificate holders, that Omni provide
an additional $60 million in insurance coverage to account for the loss of
terrorism coverage created when the insurance industry decided to exclude
terrorism from all risk policies.”129
The court’s reasoning in Omni Berkshire is problematic from contract
and insurance perspectives. Presumably, the parties understood “all risk” in
1998 meant the inclusion of terrorism risk, which was the industry standard at
the time.130 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the agreed price in the
credit agreement incorporated the mitigation of this risk through insurance.
Even if the parties had not specifically bargained or thought to bargain over
this point, the price achieved would have been the same had they negotiated
over the specific point because terrorism risk was included in all risk policies
at the time. 131 The court’s ruling in effect changes the terms of the credit
transaction because the parties at the time of contracting could not have
predicted the industry standard governing all risk policies. The result is that
credit transactions are subject to a degree of uncertainty that cannot be
resolved at the time of contracting because the industry standard governing “all
risk” would change, but such changes are not predictable. Courts have noted in
other contexts concerning contract interpretation in credit transactions that
uncertainty should be avoided if possible for it increases the cost of capital.132
125

307 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
307 F. Supp. 2d at 539-41.
127
307 F. Supp. 2d at 541. The court noted that there was little case law on this point.
307 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citing a preliminary determination of the issue in Four Times Square
Assocs., LLC v. Cigna Invs., Inc., 306 A.D.2d 4, 764 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2003)).
128
307 F. Supp. 2d at 541-42.
129
307 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
130
307 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
131
See N.Y.—Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 179 (N.Y. 1989) (“the
commonsense rule to apply is to consider what the parties would have concluded had they
considered the subject”).
132
See U.S.—Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048
(2d Cir. 1982) (“Such uncertainties [in contract interpretation] would vastly increase the risks
and, therefore, the costs of borrowing with no offsetting benefits either in the capital market
or in the administration of justice.”).
126
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In BFP 245 Park Co., LLC v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp., the
court held that the credit agreement at issue required terrorism coverage.133
The agreement provided that the property be insured against “any peril now or
hereafter included within the classification All Risk or Special Perils, in each
case . . . in an amount equal to 100% of the Full Replacement Cost.” The court
distinguished Omni Berkshire on the ground that the agreement there did not
contain the clause “now and hereafter,” which suggests that terrorism risk
should be covered.
Credit arrangements are not the only transactions that may require the
parties to procure terrorism risk coverage. The issue also arises in the context
of commercial landlord-tenant relationships.134
[5] Consequential Damages
In Hold Brothers, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., the federal district court
considered, upon the insurer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
whether a policyholder can recover for consequential damages from an
insurer’s breach of contract.135 Guided by a New York case on consequential
damages in breach of contract actions, 136 the court ruled that to recover
consequential damages for an insurer’s breach of the policy, the policyholder
must show that such damages “were within the contemplation of the parties as
the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contract.”137 In this
regard, the insurer argued that the policy specifically excluded consequential
damages. The policy stated that the insurer “will not pay for loss or damage
caused by or resulting from . . . Consequential Losses: Delay, loss of use or
loss of market.”138 Elsewhere, the policy provided that the insurer will not pay
for “Any other consequential loss.”139
N.Y.—Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1520
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The sort of unbounded and one-sided elasticity [in interpreting the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in credit transactions] . . . would interfere with and
destabilize the market.”).
See also N.Y.—Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F.
Supp. 1529, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that the subjective expectations of bondholders in
a contract term providing redemption limitation “would likely cause greater uncertainty
among bondholders”).
133
N.Y.—BFP 245 Park Co., LLC v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp., 12 A.D.3d
330, 786 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2004).
See N.Y.—Four Times Square Assoc., LLC v. Cigna Investments, Inc., 306 A.D.2d
4, 764 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2003) (granting landlord preliminary injunction against the servicer of a
loan from holding the loan in default for failing to obtain terrorism coverage).
134
See, e.g., N.Y.—TAG 380, LLC v. GMAC Commercial Mort. Corp., 40 A.D.3d 1,
830 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2007) (holding that the lease did not require the procurement of terrorism
coverage by the tenant).
135
N.Y.—357 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
136
See N.Y.—Kenford Co. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1989).
137
357 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kenford, 537
N.E.2d at 178).
138
357 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
139
357 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
24-65

The court made a distinction between contractual agreement on exclusion,
which goes to the terms of the policy, and the legal remedy that can be had for
a breach of the contract. It found the exclusions in the policy to be coverage
exclusions, but these terms did not address whether consequential damages
would be allowed for a breach of the contract. “Thus, while the cited policy
language may ultimately have a direct bearing on what damages for breach
were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, a
question of fact exists as to whether these provisions exclude the recovery of
consequential damages.”140
In Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., the federal district court,
again construing New York law, applied similar reasoning:
However, a policy exclusion speaks only to what constitutes a
covered loss under a policy of insurance, and not to what
remedies are available for breach of a policy. The scope of a
policy’s coverage and the damages that are recoverable if the
insurer breaches the policy are, of course, distinct concepts.
Payment to an insured for a covered and non-excluded loss is
performance under the contract of insurance. Breach of the
contract of insurance is an entirely different matter governed by
the present day successors to Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,
156 E.R. 145 (1854) such as the Kenford case discussed
above.141
Because there was still a factual question of the parties’ intent as to
consequential damages in the event of a breach of contract, it precluded the
grant of summary judgment.142
[6] Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. v. Allianz Ins. Co., the Federal District
Court determined, upon a motion for remand to the state court, whether the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (the “Act”) 143
provided subject matter jurisdiction to the federal court in an insurance
dispute.144 The plaintiff insureds, including the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey and the World Trade Center lessee, sought a declaration from
the defendant insurers that the “Conceptual Framework” agreed upon to
redevelop the WTC site will not violate any anti-assignment provisions of the
policies. Financing for the rebuilding plan depended on the insurance proceeds.
Failing to reach a satisfactory agreement on the point, the plaintiffs filed suit in
140

357 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
Accord N.Y.— 326 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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326 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
326 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
143
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 241 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
note). Among other things, Section 403 of the Act created the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund.
144
443 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
142
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New York state court, and the defendants removed the action to the District
Court. The parties agreed that the sole basis for jurisdiction was Section
408(b)(3) of the Act, which provides:
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property,
personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.
At issue was whether the Act provides subject matter jurisdiction for an
insurance dispute concerning the economics of the rebuilding effort at the
WTC. Citing Second Circuit precedent, the court rejected a reading of Section
408(b)(3) that would provide the federal court exclusive jurisdiction for every
action involving economic losses having a causal connection to September
11.145 It reasoned that the dispute is “a matter of pure contract interpretation
that does not require the court to revisit what happened on 9/11.”146 While the
suit has a connection to September 11, the essential dispute lacks a direct
proximity to the attacks of September 11 in the way that “claim[s] for loss of
property, personal injury, or death” resulting from the attacks do. Thus, the
court remanded the action back to the New York state court.
§ 191.03

Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002

[A]

Time Frame and Program Expiration

On November 26, 2002, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(“TRIA”) was signed into law.147 TRIA established a Federal “backstop” for
145

443 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
See U.S.—Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung
(Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Second Circuit in Canada Life
held that Section 408(b)(3) did not create jurisdiction over a contract dispute between a
reinsurer and its retrocessionaire for liability arising out of claims by victims of September 11.
335 F.3d at 54, 57.
146
443 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
147
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002),
15 U.S.C. § 6701 note.
Title I of the statute sets forth the federal insurance program. Additionally, Title II
sets forth laws concerning the treatment of terrorist assets, and Title III provisions amend
Section 11 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 248. TRIA §§ 201, 301. Section 201(a) of
Title II provides that in the case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist
party, “the blocked assets of that terrorist party . . . shall be subject to execution or attachment
in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment.” Blocked asset means any asset seized
or frozen by the United States under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50
U.S.C. § App. 5(b)) or under sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702). TRIA § 201(d)(2). The statute does not affect the
immunities provided in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. TRIA § 201(a) (judgment
against blocked assets applies only if the terrorist party is not immune under 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7)). See note 76 above and accompanying text. Title II also sets forth special rules in
cases against Iran. TRIA § 201(c)-(d).
Also, TRIA does not affect the jurisdiction or regulatory authority of state insurance
commissioners to otherwise regulate the insurance market. TRIA § 106(a).
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large losses from terrorism. It is public-private cost sharing program with the
private insurance industry (hereinafter referred to as the “Program”). Unlike a
private reinsurance arrangement with insurers, the government funds losses,
determined by a statutory formula, 148 but it does not collect premiums or
develop a reserve prior to the occurrence of an event. Federal payout is subject
to an ex post mandatory recoupment, as determined by a statutory formula, and
discretionary recoupment. 149 Because the Program does not require the
recoupment of all federal payouts, the cost sharing arrangement is a form of
subsidized reinsurance that provides a layer of capital protection in the event of
a large catastrophic terrorist attack.
The Program is administered by the Secretary of Treasury (the
“Secretary”),150 and it requires the property and casualty insurance companies
to make available terrorism coverage to policyholders under terms and
premium pricing not materially different from other risks in exchange for
federal compensation under the Program’s terms and conditions, and in turn
the Program provides for a scheme under which the federal government bears a
substantial portion of losses upon the losses exceeding a defined trigger.
Because TRIA was envisioned as a temporary price stabilization measure,
it had a sunset date of December 31, 2005. 151 Shortly before the sunset of
TRIA, and in response to considerable lobbying from the insurance and
business interests, the government extended the Program by enacting the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 (the “Extension Act of
2005”).152 The Extension Act of 2005 extended TRIA for another two years
and modified some key terms of TRIA, including establishing higher
deductible levels.153 Shortly before sunset of the Extension Act of 2005, the
Program was modified and extended for another seven years under the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (the
“Reauthorization Act of 2007”).154 As amended, the Program now has a sunset
date of December 31, 2014.
148

See § 191[E] below.
See § 191[E] & [F] below.
150
See § 191[J] below.
151
TRIA § 108(a). Section 103(c)(2) provides that not later than September 1, 2004, the
Secretary shall determine whether the Program should be extended to 2005. On June 18, 2004,
the Secretary announced his decision to extend the “make available” requirements through
2005. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Technical Amendments to “Make Available”
Provisions and “Insurer Deductible” Definition, 70 Fed. Reg. 7403, 7404 (Feb. 14, 2005) (to
be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
152
Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119 Stat.
2660, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note. The statute was signed into law on December 22, 2005.
153
See note 230 below.
154
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110160, 121 Stat. 1839 (2007), 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note. The statute was signed into law on
December 26, 2007. In addition to extending the Program through 2014, the Reauthorization
Act of 2007 made the following significant changes to TRIA as amended by the Extension
Act of 2005: (1) applied a 133% surcharge multiplier to the mandatory recoupment, see §
191.03[F][1] below; (2) directed that the 3% surcharge applies to discretionary recoupment
only, see § 191.03[F][2] below; (3) applied a fixed timetable for the recovery of mandatory
recoupment, see § 191.03[F][3] below.
149
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Given that Congress has extended TRIA twice for a total of nine
additional years beyond the original three-year program, it is clear that a shortterm price stabilization measure has turned into a long-term, public-private
cost sharing program. As a matter of policy and politics, it is an open question
whether the Program will be made permanent through a series of extensions, or
whether the private sector will eventually be willing to assume the risk of
extreme terrorism. There is no way to forecast the likely outcome of the
Program, other than to suggest that the insurance industry and the business
community will continue to lobby for a government co-share program. It is
clear that any contribution that subsidizes the risk of terrorism, i.e., the
mechanism in which the costs of terrorism are not fully internalized to the
activity, is a benefit that inures to the bearers of that risk. The broader policy
question is whether the subsidization and externalization of the cost to the
American public are justified by other considerations, perhaps for example that
they help to spread the risk more broadly. The Program’s fate beyond 2014
will depend on a number of factors, including the political environment, the
history of terrorism loss and claims, and the state of the insurance and financial
markets.
The focus of this chapter is on the Program, as amended by the Extension
Act of 2005 and the Reauthorization Act of 2007. Where appropriate, this
chapter identifies and analyzes the changes made to TRIA and subsequent
developments of the Program.155
[B]

Congressional Findings and Purpose

In enacting TRIA, Congress found that the market could not support
“reasonable and predictable prices” because September 11 hindered the normal
risk spreading function, which in turn adversely affected economic growth and
development. 156 The insurance and financial markets, vital to the national
economy and its smooth operation, faced “widespread financial market
uncertainties” including significant actuarial data and methods to properly
allocate risk and loss. 157 The withdrawal of insurance from the market and
substantial premium increases could seriously undermine or otherwise
suppress economic activity. 158 Thus, Congress found that the federal
government should provide a temporary financial cost sharing scheme, thereby
contributing to the stabilization of the national economy, while insurance
industry and capital markets develop products and programs necessary to
create a market for private terrorism risk insurance.159
155

TRIA and its amendments set forth for different years different trigger amounts,
deductibles, industry aggregate retention levels, and surcharge multiplier. Since September 11,
there has been no terrorist act in the United States or its carriers that has triggered the Program.
Since only the present and future are relevant for the determination of losses and payouts, this
chapter sets forth the relevant figures for 2008 and forward. The footnotes annotate the
different figures for past years.
156
TRIA § 101(a)(1).
157
TRIA §§ 101(a)(2)-(4).
158
TRIA §§ 101(a)(5).
159
TRIA § 101(a)(6).
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Based on these findings, Congress enacted the Program to (1) assure
“widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance
for terrorism risk,” and (2) “allow for a transitional period for the private
markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to
absorb any future losses.”160
[C]

Mandatory Participation and Availability
[1] “Insurer” and “Affiliate”

The Program is mandatory. It requires that an “insurer,” as defined by the
statute, “shall participate in the program.”161
An “insurer” is an entity that is (1) licensed or admitted to engage in the
business of providing primary or excess insurance in any state,162 (2) federally
approved to offer property and casualty insurance in connection with maritime,
energy or aviation activity,163 (3) a state residual market insurance entity or
state workers’ compensation fund, 164 or (4) a captive or self-insurance
arrangement to the extent provided for in the rules of the Secretary.165
Moreover, to meet the definition of an insurer, an entity must receive
“direct earned premium”166 for providing any type of commercial “property
and casualty insurance” coverage.167 Direct earned premium is interpreted to

160

TRIA § 101(b).
TRIA § 103(a)(3).
162
TRIA § 102(a)(6)(A)(i). See 31 C.F.R. § 50.5(f). If the entity is not licensed or
admitted, it is still an insurer if it is an eligible surplus line carrier listed on the Quarterly
Listed of Alien Insurers of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. TRIA §
102(a)(6)(A)(ii).
163
TRIA § 102(a)(6)(A)(iii).
164
TRIA § 102(a)(6)(A)(iv). The Secretary must issue rules pertaining to state residual
market insurance entities and state workers’ compensation funds. TRIA § 103(d)(1). A state
residual market insurance entity that does not share its profits and losses with private sector
insurers is a separate insurer. TRIA § 103(d)(2). One that shares its profits and losses is not
treated as a separate entity, and must report to each private sector insurance participant its
share of insured losses of the entity, which must then be included in each private sector
insurer’s insured losses. Id. Moreover, any private insurer that shares profits and losses with a
state residual market insurance entity must include in its calculations of premiums any
premiums provided by the state residual market insurance entity. TRIA § 103(d)(3). The
Secretary’s rules on state residual markets are found in 31 C.F.R. Subpart D, §§ 50.30, 50.33,
50.35, 50.36.
165
TRIA § 102(a)(6)(A)(v). Captive insurers or other self-insurance arrangements are
eligible for the Program, but only if the Secretary, prior to the occurrence of an act of
terrorism, decides in consultation with state and regulatory bodies to apply the Program.
TRIA § 103(f).
166
“Direct earned premium” means a direct earned premium for property and casualty
insurance issued by any insurer for insurance against losses occurring at the locations covered
by the Program. TRIA § 102(4). See TRIA § 102(15) (providing locations that the Program
covers).
167
TRIA § 102(a)(6)(B). This requirement does not apply to a state residual market
insurance entity, state workers’ compensation fund, captive insurer, or other self-insurance
arrangements described in TRIA §§ 103(d), (f). See notes 164 & 165 above. Also, the
161
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mean “all commercial property and casualty insurance (as that term is used in
the Act and Treasury’s regulations) issues by an insurer for insurance against
losses at the specified locations” covered by the Program. 168 If an insurer
covers both commercial and noncommercial risk exposures, it may allocate the
premiums in accordance with the proportion of risk between the two
components to ascertain direct earned premium.169 The same rule applies for
coverages for loss in locations that are and are not covered by the Program.170
The definition of “property and casualty insurance” includes excess
insurance and workers’ compensation insurance.171 It excludes the following
types of insurance, and therefore these product lines and their underwriters are
not covered by the Program:172
• federal crop insurance and reinsurance under the Federal
Crop Insurance Act, or any other type of crop or livestock
insurance that is privately issued or reinsured;
• private mortgage insurance or title insurance;
• financial guaranty insurance issued by monoline financial
guaranty insurance corporations;
• medical malpractice insurance;
• health and life insurance, including group life insurance;
• flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act of
1968;
• reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance;
• commercial automobile insurance;
• burglary and theft insurance;
• surety insurance (which TRIA had originally included);
• professional liability insurance;
• farm owners multiple peril insurance.
The definition of an “insurer” includes “any affiliate.”173 An “affiliate”
means “any entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
Secretary may prescribe other requirements or restrictions to the definition of insurer. TRIA §
102(a)(6)(C).
168
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 48280, 48281 (Aug. 13, 2003) (to
be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
169
31 C.F.R. § 50.5(d)(iv) (2007).
170
Id.
171
TRIA §102(12)(A). The Extension Act of 2005 eliminated surety insurance and
included directors and officers liability insurance. Extension Act of 2005 § 3(b)(2). Property
and casualty umbrella insurance is considered “excess insurance” and is therefore included in
the Program. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Disclosures and Mandatory Availability
Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 59720, 59725 (Oct. 17, 2003) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part
50).
172

TRIA § 102(12)(B)(i)-(vii), as amended by Extension Act of 2005 § 3(b). See
Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. (providing federal crop insurance
program); Homeowners Protection Act of 1998, 12 U.S.C. § 4901 (providing definition of
private mortgage insurance); National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.
(providing federal flood insurance program).
173
TRIA § 102(6).
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with the insurer.” 174 An entity is conclusively deemed to “control” another
entity if (1) it directly or indirectly owns, controls or has power to vote 25% or
more of any class of voting securities of the other entity, (2) it controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees, or (3) the
Secretary otherwise determines that the entity directly or indirectly exercises a
controlling influence.175
If an insurer does not come within the above conclusive control
provisions, the Secretary will apply a rebuttable presumption of controlling
influence if at least two of the following factors exist:
• The insurer is one of the two largest shareholders of any class of voting
stock;
• The insurer holds more than 35 percent of the combined debt securities
and equity of the other insurer;
• The insurer is party to an agreement pursuant to which the insurer
possesses a material economic stake in another insurer resulting from
a profit-sharing arrangement, use of common names, facilities or
personnel, or the provision of essential services to another insurer
• The insurer is party to an agreement that enables the insurer to
influence a material aspect of the management or policies of another
insurer
• The insurer would have the ability, other than through holding of
revocable proxies, to direct the votes of more than 25 percent of the
other insurer’s voting stock in the future upon the occurrence of an
event
• The insurer has the power to direct the disposition of more than 25
percent of a class of voting stock in a manner other than a widely
dispersed or public offering
• The insurer and/or the insurer’s representative or nominee constitute
more than one member of the other insurer’s board of directors
• The insurer or its nominee or an officer of the insurer serves as the
chairman of the board, chairman of the executive committee, chief
executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer or in
any position with similar policymaking authority in another
insurer.176
In addition to at least one of the above factors, if any one of the following
factors exists, there is a rebuttable presumption of control:
• A state has determined that an insurer controls another insurer;
• An insurer provides 25 percent or more of capital or policyholder
surplus; or

174

TRIA § 102(2).
TRIA § 102(2); 31 C.F.R. §§ 50.5(c)(2)-(3).
176
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, at 41252 (July 11, 2003) (to
be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50); 31 C.F.R. § 50.5(c)(4)(iv).
175
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• An insurer supplies 25 percent or more of the underwriting capacity for
that year to an insurer that is a syndicate consisting of a group of
underwriters.177
The Secretary interprets the statute to mean that “affiliated entities are
treated as a consolidated entity for the purpose of calculating direct earned
premium.”178 Non-insurers are not included in the definition of affiliate, and
thus only insurers can be considered affiliated for the purpose of the
Program.179
[2] “Make Available”
The Program requires that insurers “(A) shall make available, in all of its
property and casualty insurance policies, coverage for insured losses; and (B)
shall make available property and casualty insurance coverage for insured
losses that does not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other
coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of
terrorism.” 180 The Program requires that insurers may not exclude from its
property and casualty insurance policies certified acts of terrorism. This
provision is the essential legislative quid pro quo: in exchange for federal cost
sharing, insurers must provide terrorism coverage at premium levels that are
not materially different from coverage of other property and casualty risks.181
The “make available” mandate reverses the terrorism exclusions filed and
issued in the immediate wake of September 11.
All property and casualty insurers, as defined, must participate in the
Program, and must “make available” terrorism risk coverage “that does not
differ materially” from other types of risks. Note that this does not mean that
terrorism risk is not subject to ordinary exclusions applicable to other covered
risks, such as exclusions for losses associated with war and sovereign acts, and
nuclear, biological and chemical events.182
Although the Program is mandatory for property and casualty insurers, it
is voluntary for policyholders.183
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, at 41255 (July 11, 2003) (to
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, 41254 to 41255 (July 11,
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, 41253 (July 11, 2003) (to
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See note 277 & accompanying text below. At some point in time, the government
may consider covering these losses. See Extension Act of 2005 § 8.
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See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Action, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 435 (2005) (discussing
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[3] Disclosure of Premium
In providing terrorism coverage, the insurer must provide a “clear and
conspicuous disclosure to the policyholder of the premium charged for insured
losses covered by the Program and the Federal share of compensation for
insured losses under the Program.”184
[D]

Certification of “Act of Terrorism”

To qualify for compensation under the Program, the Secretary must
certify an event as an “act of terrorism.” 185 The certification of an “act of
terrorism” must be in concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General.186 The Secretary may not delegate the determination of whether an act
of terrorism occurred.187 Given the inherent uncertainties of how future acts of
terrorism will develop and the impossibility of predicting the circumstances in
which the insurers, policyholders and the government will find themselves,
there is no specified time frame for certification after the occurrence of an
attack. 188 The Secretary’s certification decision is final and not subject to
judicial review.189
The Secretary cannot certify an act if the insurance losses comprise less
than $5 million.190 Final rules make clear that this figure is not a limitation as
to any single insurer loss, but is an aggregate loss figure.191
The Secretary also cannot certify an act if “the act is committed as a part
of . . . a war declared by the Congress.”192 In other words, losses from war are
not compensable under the Program. Final rules issued by the Secretary
interpret this clause to mean that the war exclusion to certification “applies
only to acts of terrorism committed in connection with a formal,
congressionally declared war.”193 Congressional authorization to the President
to engage in military action does not come within the war exclusion to
certification. For example, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”194 gave the President authority to conduct
184

TRIA § 103(b)(2). See 31 C.F.R. § 50.12 (2007). The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners has drafted model disclosure forms, reproductions of which are
found in § 191.05 of this chapter. See note 307 & accompanying text and forms below.
185
TRIA § 102(1)(A).
186
TRIA § 102(1)(A).
187
TRIA § 102(1)(D).
188
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 4125, 41252 (July 11, 2003) (to be
codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
189
TRIA § 102(1)(C).
190
TRIA § 102(1)(B)(ii).
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, 41252 (July 11, 2003) (to
be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
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military operations, and indeed a full scale war between the military forces of
the United States and Iraq ensued, but it is not a formal declaration of war for
the purposes of the Program.195
That the Secretary can certify acts of terrorism absent congressional
declaration of war does not mean that the war exclusion is irrelevant. Many
policies contain exclusions for losses from war and sovereign acts.196 Under
the application of state law, an exclusion for war loss or sovereign acts may
apply to preclude compensation to the policyholder even though the act of
terrorism could have been certified. The Program mandates that terrorism risk
coverage must not be materially different from other coverages. The
Secretary’s rules make clear that “[i]f an insurer does not cover all types of
risks, then it is not required to cover the excluded risks in satisfying the
requirement to make available coverage for losses resulting from an act of
terrorism that does not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other
coverage limitations applicable to acts of terrorism.”197 The Program allows
ordinary exclusions allowable under state law, such as nuclear, biological and
chemical events. 198 War and sovereign act exclusions are also ordinary
exclusions founds in many policies.
In the above example of the Iraq War, the Secretary can certify an act of
terrorism in connection with the war because Congress did not declare war
against Iraq. Suppose as a hypothetical the Iraqi military forces, clearly
identify as so, had executed an attack against the American homeland. Under
state law, this scenario would pose a likelihood of exclusion. Thus, the act of
terrorism could have been certified by the Secretary, but would most likely be
excluded under the terms of the policy.
The war exclusion is still relevant in a narrow area. The above Iraq
example might provide good legal, political and moral bases to invoke a
contract exclusion. As long as the war or sovereign act is manifestly clear,
unlike the case in September 11 where the argument was only colorable, the
industry can invoke the exclusion and do so in a way that does not do
substantial or lasting damage to goodwill and political capital.
[E]

Definition of “Act of Terrorism”

As amended, TRIA sets forth two essential elements of an act of
terrorism:
(1) “a violent act or an act that is dangerous to human life; property;
or belowstructure; to have resulted in damage within the United
States, or outside the United States in the case of an air carrier or
vessel . . . or the premises of a United States mission”
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, 41252 (July 11, 2003) (to
be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
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(2) “to have been committed . . . as part of an effort to coerce the
civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or
affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”199
This statutory definition is the exclusive definition for the Program, and it
preempts any inconsistent state law.200
The definition of terrorism is rooted in past experience of violent acts
typically in the form of random bombings, hijackings, killings and other acts of
destruction. The definition envisions the damage or destruction to life or
property from a physical force, which is typically how terroristic acts have
occurred and how they are perceived. But there are ambiguities in the statutory
scheme, and the Program may leave essential gaps in coverage.
[1] “Damage” and Economic Loss
A loss of “human life,” “property” or “infrastructure” is required. The
statute does not define property or infrastructure. Obviously, physical assets
such as buildings, bridges and airplanes fit within the definitions of property
and infrastructure. But an ambiguity arises in the case of economic terrorism.
Not only was the terrorist attack of September 11 a large scale, militarylike strike against a major urban center, but it also targeted the national
economy. It is reasonable to presume that in attacking the Pentagon and the
World Trade Centers, the terrorists intended to harm the symbols of American
government and economy. Indeed, the September 11 attack was the second
attack against the World Trade Center by radical Islamic terrorists.
As made clear in the definition of terrorism, the ultimate goal of
terrorism is to “coerce” populations and governments. Acts of destruction are
simply the means of coercion. While terrorism in the past has relied on the
application of destructive force, the evolution of terrorism in the future may
lead to nonviolent attacks against the national and international economies and
infrastructures. The roots of terrorism have many dimensions, and it is beyond
the scope of this treatise chapter to explore the nuances of the causes of
terrorism, but one obvious dimension is a resistance to Western political,
cultural and economic influence. In the future, there is the distinct possibility
of economic terrorism to undermine Western populations and governments,
which place a high priority in national and international economic stability and
growth. In the past, violence has typically been the means of terrorism, perhaps
because this was the available means to coerce policy, but coercion and
influence can be brought about by nonviolent means as the techniques of
coercion evolve and become more sophisticated.
One need not stretch the imagination to see the potential economic harm
from minimum levels of sabotage. For example, according to Swiss Re
estimates, the 2001 power failures in California caused a productivity loss of
199

TRIA § 102(1)(A), as amended 2007 Act § 2 (internal section designations omitted).
A covered air carrier is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 40102, and a covered vessel is a United States
flag vessel. TRIA § 102(5)(B). The United States includes “the territorial sea and the
continental shelf of the United States.” TRIA § 102(15).
200
TRIA § 106(a)(2)(A).
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$21.8 billion, private party income loss of $4.5 billion, and 135,000 jobs; and,
the power failure that blacked out the northeast United States on August 14,
2003, caused losses of $75–$100 million from food spoilage alone.201
One plausible scenario of economic terrorism is the interference with or
disablement of vital information technology property and belowstructure
through nonviolent or nonphysical means. Cyber-terrorism can diminish the
economic value tied to functionality without damaging or destroying the
physical asset.202 One can easily imagine how a computer program virus can
“damage” or destroy “property” or “belowstructure” within the ordinary
meaning of these terms, and such acts may trigger private insurance coverage,
depending upon how the contractual language is drafted. American common
law recognizes a property interest based on the interference of the functionality
of information technology systems, and thus a tort action is possible for an act
that diminishes the function of a computer system. 203 A policyholder may
obtain coverage for business interruption or consequential loss, which may
include the loss of information technology systems. Thus, there is a question of
whether the Program covers cases of economic and cyber-terrorism.
[2] “Violent” and “Dangerous” Acts
Related to the issue of economic terrorism is the question of whether
diminishment of capacity absent physical alteration of the asset suffices for the
Secretary to deem it “damage.” This term is sufficiently broad to cover loss of
function and resulting economic loss as would be provided in business
interruption coverage. 204 The definition of terrorism, however, suggests that
the compensation provided by the Program is limited to destructive acts
brought about by a physical force or agent.
The statute provides that “damage” is the resulting outcome. Damage or
loss must arise from a “violent” or “dangerous” act. One must presume that
these two terms are not redundant. Clearly, violence refers to the application of
physical force.205 The definition connotes that a positive force of some kind
suddenly impacts the victim or protected object, such as a bomb or a shooting.
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Christian Brauner, Swiss Re, The Risk Landscape of the Future 15 (2004).
See Tara Mythri Raghavan, In Fear of Cyberterrorism: An Analysis of the
Congressional Response, 2003 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 297 (discussing federal legislation
addressing cyber-terrorism in the wake of September 11).
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If a nonviolent act that causes a loss falls within the definition of
terrorism, the Secretary must determine it to be a “dangerous” act. This term
provides more leeway for unconventional acts of terrorism that do not involve
the application of violent force. An act could be determined to be perilous,
hazardous or unsafe even though it may not be characterized as violent.206 In
the context of terrorism, the natural interpretative difference between “violent”
and “dangerous” is that the latter need not connote the positive application of
some physical force impacting upon the victim. An act can be considered
nonviolent but yet exceedingly dangerous: e.g., exposure to pathogens or
chemicals. Between these two terms, Congress covered virtually all scenarios
of the conventional view of terrorism.
Although a nonviolent or nonphysical act may plausibly be considered a
“dangerous” act, there is still the question of whether the Program does or
should cover losses from such acts. Of course, Congress envisioned an act of
terrorism as the application of a harmful physical force or agent against a
person or property. This risk is extraordinary, one that is not likely to occur
and, if it does occur, likely to inflict severe consequences. On the other hand,
the risk of the failure of information technology infrastructure is one that
businesses already face, irrespective of terrorism. Terrorism is not the only
reason why such systems may be sabotaged; competitors and no-cause
saboteurs such as computer hackers may do the same. Because this risk is real
and substantial, irrespective of terrorism, the private sector invests heavily in
system security, redundancy, and recovery. One can argue that this is a risk
that private parties, policyholders and insurers, allocate themselves, and that
there is no need for governmental assistance under these circumstances. Thus,
the statutory language and the rationale of the Program do not support
extension of the Program to economic terrorism and cyber-terrrorism that are
not accompanied by an act that falls within the meaning of “violent” or
“dangerous.”
The above interpretation of “violent” and “dangerous” is supported by
the preemption provisions of the statute. The Program preempts all state law
causes of action “for property damage, personal injury, or death.”207
Consider cases like New Market Inv. Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.208
There, a conventional act of terrorism (introduction of poison to food products)
directly and proximately caused physical losses to the policyholder’s property.
Cases like New Market present a stronger claim for coverage under the
Program than cases where there was no violent or dangerous act in the plain
meaning of those terms in the context of assessing an act of terrorism.
Ultimately, in the case of an unconventional act that inflicts damage to
property or infrastructure, resulting in great consequential economic harm for
which there may be insurance coverage, the Secretary must exercise discretion
and determine the policy question of whether such economic losses should be
covered under the Program. Absent a statutory clarification or the issuance of a
206

See Black’s Law Dictionary 399 (7th ed. 1999); Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 324 (1983).
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TRIA § 107(a)(2).
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See note 57 & accompanying text above.
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rule by the Secretary, one can reasonably foresee that the Secretary’s decision
would depend on the circumstances of the loss, the extent of the loss, the
impact on the national economy, the financial conditions of the affected
policyholders and insurers, and the degree to which the risk was capable of
being borne solely by the private sector.
[3] Domestic Terrorism
An act of terrorism also requires that the act be done with the purpose of
coercing the public or influencing the policies of the American government. In
the original version of TRIA, a terrorist was defined as “an individual or
individuals acting on behalf of foreign person or foreign interest.”209 In the
Reauthorization Act of 2007, this definitional component was deleted.210 The
Program as amended now can encompass acts of domestic terrorism conducted
by domestic terrorists, including American natives, citizens, or residents.
Nationality or immigration status is unimportant. Since the original language
required that a person be “acting on behalf of foreign person or foreign
interest,” the Program covers any terroristic act by any person, foreign or
domestic, even if that person is not acting “on behalf” of a foreign person or
interest.
The purpose of the amendment in the Reauthorization Act of 2007
appears to be two-fold. First, it may be extremely difficult to show a causal
connection among a terrorist, who may have died during the attack as was the
case in September 11, the purpose of the act, and a foreign interest. The
statutory requirement in the original TRIA intended to address the greatest
threat to domestic security, that of radical Islamic terrorism. But the statute
may have imposed an unintended, burdensome evidentiary hurdle in order to
trigger the Program. Second, even if Congress was primarily concerned with
radical Islamic terrorism, the July 7, 2005, bombing in London showed that
domestic nationals and residents can execute terrorist attacks independent of
any foreign person or interest, 211 though the inspiration or motive for such
attacks may have some connection to a movement or cause vis-à-vis a “foreign
person or foreign interest.”
These problems prompted Congress to eliminate the requirement of
showing that an act is on behalf of a foreign person or interest. However, this
elimination also opened the Program to domestic terrorism. The Program now
includes domestic acts of terrorism such as the April, 19, 1995, bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, or violence connected to
209

TRIA § 102(1)(A)(iv). Final rules interpreting TRIA provided that “acts of domestic
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purely domestic policies and agendas carried out by various social, religious or
political groups. More troubling is the possibility that the Program can be
triggered by mass domestic riots or civil disorders that can be construed as acts
of coercion. These acts may also be excluded by the insurance policy as an
ordinary exclusion in property and casualty policies,212 but to the extent that
there is no exclusion in the policy they can trigger the Program for they can
meet the definition of a terrorist act. Again, these kinds of losses are probably
not the type that Congress contemplated in enacting TRIA.
The deletion of the term “acting on behalf of foreign person or foreign
interest” does not resolve the question of the purpose for which terrorists act. It
simply allows that terrorists can be American citizens or residents with little or
no connection to a foreign person or interest other than a commonly shared
political or religious agenda. For example, the London bombers may have been
British citizens or residents, but one can reasonably guess that they were
inspired by a virulent form of radical Islamic religious and political movement.
A plain reading of the statute, however, suggests that the Program does not
limit an act of terrorism to a specific motivation; a terrorist act seeks only “to
coerce the civilian population or to influence or coerce the policy and conduct
of the government.” The motivation can be purely domestic policies and
matters, such as abortion protests, to ill-defined political movements, such as
the protests of anarchists and isolationists, to highly defined movements such
as the global jihad of radical Islamic terrorist groups. For example, one can
easily imagine losses from violent marches or demonstrations on behalf of
various political agendas, the type of activity that, while violent, would
typically not have been classified as acts of terrorism.213
Since the Program cannot be triggered unless the Secretary certifies an
act of terrorism, such determination being discretionary, final and
unreviewable, 214 the Secretary can and should issue rules that limit the
application of the Program to riots and civil disturbances. 215 This risk has
traditionally been satisfactorily allocated in the private sector, and there is no
reason why the Program should extend coverage. In other words, the Program
extends to domestic acts of terrorism, but this does not mean that the Program
subsumes within the Secretary’s discretion coverage for all domestic acts of
criminal destruction.
The scope of the definition of domestic terrorism affects the insurer’s
“make available” obligation. Without clarification, the definitional uncertainty
See, e.g., Cal.—North Bay Schools Ins. Auth. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 6 Cal. App.
4th 1741, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (1992) (interpreting riot exclusion).
Idaho—Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987 (Idaho 1980) (same).
213
Under the current definition of terrorism, for example, it is unclear whether the 1999
demonstrations and riots in Seattle during the meeting of the World Trade Organization would
be considered an act of terrorism. See Sam Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National
Guard Is Called to Quell Trade-Talk Protests; Seattle Is Under Curfew After Disruptions,
N.Y. Times at A1 (Dec. 1, 1999).
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The Secretary has the “powers and authorities necessary to carry out the Program.”
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effectively administer and implement the Program.” TRIA § 104(a)(2).
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may call into question whether insurers can continue to exclude coverage for
riots and civil disorders. The rules suggest that they can continue to exclude
these items because an insurer “is not required to cover the excluded risks in
satisfying the requirement to make available coverage for losses resulting from
an act of terrorism.”216 To the extent that further rules are necessary to clarify
permissible exclusion and mandatory coverage, there are a number of factors
that the Secretary should consider in the certification decision: the reason or
motivation for the riot or civil disorder, the relationship between the reason and
the policies of the government and the people of the United States, the
spontaneous or planned nature of the destruction, the existence of an organized
group that led or initiated the destruction, the stated or implied mission of such
group, and the past activities of such group.
[E]

Cost Allocation and Payment Structure
[1] Insured Loss

Insured loss is subject to compensation under the Program. “Insured loss”
means any loss resulting from a certified act of terrorism (including an act of
war, in the case of workers’ compensation)217 that is covered by primary or
excess property and casualty insurance issued by an insurer.218
The definition of insured loss excludes any punitive damage awarded in
litigation. 219 Also, rules clarify that insured loss does not include extracontractual damages. In addition to punitive damages, the Program will not pay
insurers for damages to policyholders and third parties arising from breach of
contract, negligence or bad faith. 220 Also, insured loss excludes losses in
excess of policy limits.221
Insured loss includes expenses that are allocated and identified by the
claim file, but excluding staff salaries, overhead and other expenses that would
have been incurred notwithstanding the loss.222
[2] Loss Trigger
The Program has a loss trigger, which was introduced in the Extension
Act of 2005. No compensation will be paid by the Secretary unless the
216
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aggregate industry insured loss from a certified act of terrorism exceeds $100
million.223
Under this trigger, an act of terrorism can be certified by the Secretary if
it exceeds $5 million, so that losses from these acts cannot be excluded under
the “make available” provision of the Program, but losses from an act of
terrorism may not reach the $100 million trigger required to obtain payment
under the Program. In such case, the private market must bear the entire loss.
This loss trigger is sufficiently large to exclude from the Program most low
intensity violent acts, such as suicide bombings or random car bombings.
In the context of an attack against a commercial target, which is the main
purpose of the Program, the $100 million loss trigger is still relatively low as
the value of single commercial building or asset can easily exceed the trigger
amount. September 11 was the first billion dollar attack, but not the first
catastrophic terrorist attack. In the recent history of terrorism, there have been
a number of events that have exceeded $100 million.224 Clearly, the bombing
of a major commercial airliner would probably exceed $100 million in losses.
[3] Insurer’s Deductible
The “insurer deductible” means “the value of an insurer’s direct earned
premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding [the] Program
Year.”225
The reference in the statute to the preceding calendar year is a bit
ambiguous. In most cases, we would expect that an act of terrorism and the
Secretary’s certification would occur in the same calendar year. For example,
if a terrorist act occurred on June 30, 2005, meeting the loss trigger, and the
Secretary soon thereafter certifies the act, the insurer deducible would be
calculated based on calendar year 2004. But suppose that an act of terrorism
occurred in December 2005, and the Secretary soon thereafter certifies that act
223

This loss trigger applies for the calendar years 2008 to 2014. Extension Act of 2005
§ 6(2), as amended by Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 3(c)(3). In the calendar year 2006, the
loss trigger was $50 million. Extension Act of 2005 § 6(2).
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See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Action, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 435, 531 tbl. 1 (2005).
Aside from September 11, the following events resulted in catastrophic losses: bombing of
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TRIA § 102(7). See note 166 above (defining direct earned premium). When an
insurer has not had a full year of operations during the calendar year immediately preceding
the loss event, the Secretary determines the appropriate earned premium. TRIA § 102(7)(E).
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in January 2006. Depending on the reference point from which “the calendar
year immediately preceding [the] Program Year” is applied, the deductible
could be calculated from the direct earned premiums of 2004 or 2005.
The Secretary’s rule clarifies that “an insurer’s affiliates for any Program
Year shall be determined by the circumstances existing on the date of
occurrence of the act of terrorism that is the first act of terrorism in a Program
Year to be certified by the Secretary for that Program Year.”226 The use of the
occurrence of the act date is most appropriate to determine the deductible for
several reasons. The certification is simply an administrative function, a
precondition to the application of the Program, but the actuarial relationship is
between the direct earned premium and the loss occurrence. Moreover, there is
the potential for insurers to game the deductible by changing the affiliates if
there is sufficient time between occurrence and certification.
The above rule also resolves the situation where there is more than one
occurrence. It clarifies that an insurer’s affiliations are determined by the
circumstances on the date of occurrence of the first certified act. For example,
assume that a possible terrorist occurs in March (e.g., radiological exposure
whose origin and causality are unknown), and there is a continuing
investigation to determine whether the event is an act of terrorism. As a result,
the Secretary cannot yet certify the act. In September, there is a terrorist attack
that is immediately apparent (detonation of bombs in an urban area), and the
Secretary certifies this second event as an act of terrorism. In November, the
Secretary certifies the first March event as an act of terrorism. In this case of
two terrorist acts certified at different times, the affiliations for the purpose of
calculating deductibles would be fixed for the entire Program Year as of the
occurrence date of the act of terrorism in September, which is the second act of
terrorism but the first that is certified.227
If an insurer has not had a full year of operations during the calendar year
immediately preceding the Program Year, the Secretary determines the
appropriate portion of the direct earned premiums of the insurer to calculate
the deductible. 228 In such case, the Secretary’s rules provide that the direct
earned premiums for the current Program Year will be annualized.229
The Program sets forth different deductible amounts for different
Program Years. Under the Reauthorization Act of 2007, which extended the
Program for the years 2008 to 2014, the insurer’s deductible is 20 percent of
the value of an insurer’s direct earned premiums over the calendar year
immediately preceding the Program Year.230
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[4] Federal and Insurer Cost Co-Share Levels
The federal share of compensation paid under the Program is 85 percent
of “that portion of the amount of such insured losses that exceeds the
applicable insurer deductible required to be paid” during the specific Program
Year.231 The insurer is responsible for the remaining 15 percent of that portion
of losses that exceeds the deductible up to the loss cap of $100 billion of
insured losses.
[5] Loss Cap
Federal compensation under the Program and the insurer’s liability for
terrorism losses are capped at the aggregate insured losses level of $100
billion.232 The Secretary cannot make any payment for the portion of losses
exceeding this cap.233 Moreover, the Program provides that “no insurer that has
met [its] insurer deductible shall be liable for payment of any portion of the
amount of such losses that exceeds [$100 billion].”234
[6] Determination of Pro Rata Share
The Secretary determines the pro rata share of insured losses to be paid
by each insurer that incurs insured losses, except that “no insurer may be
required to make any payment for insured losses in excess of its deductible
under [TRIA] section 102(7) combined with its share of insured losses [i.e., 15
percent co-pay set forth in TRIA § 103(e)(1)(A)].”235 The Reauthorization Act
of 2007 added this last clause, and it makes clear that, once the Program is
triggered, the insurer’s exposure is limited to its deductible plus co-pay.

Program Year 1 (2003): 7 percent
Program Year 2 (2004): 10 percent
Program Year 3 (2005): 15 percent
Program Year 4 (2006): 17.5 percent
Program Year 5 (2007): 20 percent
TRIA § 102(7); Extension Act of 2005 § 3(c).
See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Terrorism Insurance: Issues of Policy, Regulation and
Coverage, New Appleman on Insurance: Current Critical Issues in Insurance Law 53 (April
2008) (“… the way insurer deductibles are set may prevent TRIA from meeting its objective
of maintaining insurer solvency in the event of a major terrorism loss.”).
231

Extension Act of 2005 § 4. Under TRIA, the Federal share was 90 percent. TRIA §
103(e)(1)(A). The 85 percent co-share took into effect in Program Year 5 (2007). The Federal
co-share is reduced by the amount of compensation provided by any other Federal program.
TRIA § 103(e)(1)(B).
232
TRIA § 103(e)(2)(i). The Secretary must notify Congress if estimated or actual
aggregate insured losses exceed $100 billion during the Program. Id. § 103(e)(3), as amended
by Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 3(c)(5).
233
TRIA § 103(e)(2)(ii).
234
TRIA § 103(e)(2)(ii), as amended Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(a)(1)(B).
235
TRIA § 103(e)(2)(B), as amended Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(a)(2).
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The Reauthorization Act of 2007 also mandates that no later than 240
days after its enactment, the Secretary must issue final regulations for
determining the pro rata share of insured losses under the Program when
insured losses exceed the $100 billion cap.236 Presumably, the final regulations
would address issues such as whether insured losses exceeding the cap should
be a factor in the calculation of the pro rata share, the method to allocate such
losses in the calculation of the insurer’s pro rata payment from the Program,
and other factors that the Secretary may weigh, for example, considerations of
an insurer’s solvency, market conditions, fairness and other policy concerns.
The Secretary’s determination of payments and the methods and
calculations used in making that determination are final and not subject to
judicial review.237
[F]

Recoupment
[1] Mandatory Recoupment

Once the federal government provides compensation, the Program
requires a mandatory recoupment amount. The mandatory recoupment amount
is the difference between the insurance marketplace aggregate retention
amount (“aggregate retention”) and the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of
insured losses that the federal government does not compensate because such
losses are within the insurer deductible, or the portion of losses of the insurer’s
co-pay amount (“insurer payment”). 238 If the insurer payment exceeds the
aggregate retention, then the mandatory recoupment amount is nil.239
The insurer payment is the sum of the insurers’ deductible and 15 percent
co-share. Under the Reauthorization Act of 2007, which applies to Program
Years 2008 to 2014, the aggregate retention is the lesser of $27.5 billion and
the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses.240

236

Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(c)(2). Final rules must be issued on or about August
22, 2008. The Reauthorization Act of 2007 also requires the Secretary to report to designated
committees of Congress within 120 days of the statute’s enactment, or on or about April 24,
2008, the process to be used to determine the allocation of pro rata payments for insured
losses under the Program when such losses exceed $100 billion. Id.
237
TRIA § 103(e)(5).
238
TRIA § 103(e)(7)(A).
239
TRIA § 103(e)(7)(B).
240
Extension Act of 2005 § 5(a)(3), as amended by Reauthorization Act of 2007 §
3(c)(6). The insurance marketplace aggregate retention amounts for previous years of the
Program are the lesser of the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses and the
following amounts.
Transition Year (2002): $10 billion
Program Year 1 (2003): $10 billion
Program Year 2 (2004): $12.5 billion
Program Year 3 (2005): $15 billion
Program Year 4 (2006): $25 billion
Program Year 5 (2007): $27.5 billion
TRIA § 103(7); Extension Act of 2005 § 5(a).
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The Secretary must collect repayment of the mandatory recoupment
through “terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums in an amount equal to 133
percent of any mandatory recoupment amount for such period.”241 The 133
percent multiplier is intended to neutralize the lost tax revenue when
policyholders deduct the surcharges on their corporate taxes. The following is
a summary of the mandatory recoupment calculation.
Scenario #1: Aggregate Retention > Insurer Payment
Recoupment = 133% x (Aggregate Retention – Insurer Payment)
Scenario #2:

Aggregate Retention < Insurer Payment
Recoupment = 0

Not later than 90 days after the date of an act of terrorism, the Secretary
must publish an estimate of aggregate insured losses, which will be used as the
basis for determining whether mandatory recoupment will be required, and
such estimate will be subject to updating as appropriate.242
[2] Discretionary Recoupment
If the Federal government’s payment exceeds any mandatory recoupment
amount, the Secretary may recoup, through terrorism loss risk-spreading
premiums, additional amounts based on the following factors: (1) the ultimate
cost of the Program to taxpayers, (2) the economic conditions in the
commercial marketplace, including factors indicating the financial health of
the insurance industry, (3) the affordability of commercial insurance for small
and medium sized businesses, and (4) other factors that the Secretary may
deem relevant.243
[3] Recoupment Through Policy Surcharge
The Secretary is responsible for the collection of recoupment. In
determining the method and manner of imposing the surcharge, the Secretary
must take into consideration the economic impact on commercial centers of
urban areas, including commercial rents and insurance premium prices, the risk
factors related to rural areas and smaller commercial centers, including the
potential exposure to loss and the likely magnitude of such loss, potential for
cross-subsidization between urban and rural areas, and various exposures to
terrorism risk for different product lines of insurance.244
241

TRIA § 103(e)(7)(C), as amended by Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(1)(A).
Reauthorization Act of 2007 §4(e)(1).
243
TRIA § 103(e)(7)(D).
244
TRIA § 103(e)(8)(D). The Secretary has discretion to adjust the timing of
recoupment collection to provide for equivalent application of the provisions to policies that
are not based on a calendar year, or to apply such provisions on a daily, monthly, or quarterly
242
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Any recoupment amount is collected as a terrorism loss risk-spreading
premium. 245 This surcharge premium is imposed on property and casualty
insurance policies in force after the date the surcharge is established, and is
based on the percentage of premium amount charged under the policy for the
property and casualty coverage.246
For an act of terrorism that occurs in or before calendar year 2010, the
Secretary must collect all mandatory recoupment by September 30, 2012.247
For any act of terrorism that occurs in calendar year 2011, the Secretary must
collect 35 percent of any mandatory recoupment by September 30, 2012, and
the remainder by September 30, 2017.248 For any act of terrorism that occurs in
calendar year 2012 to 2014, the Secretary must collect all mandatory
recoupment by September 30, 2017.249
These timetables for collection of mandatory recoupment do not apply to
any determination of discretionary recoupment. A terrorism loss risk-premium
collected on a discretionary basis may not exceed, on an annual basis, 3
percent of the premium charged under the policy.250
[4] Examples of Payments and Recoupments
Example 1
In 2010, a terrorist attack causes $80 million of insured losses. There are
20 insurers impacted, and their direct earned premium is $2 billion.
Trigger:
Deductible:
Insurer Co-Pay:
Federal Co-Pay:
Total Insurer Loss:

Not Satisfied (< $100 million loss)
NA
NA
NA
$80 million

Although the Secretary can certify the terrorist attack, the loss does not
trigger the Program. Losses must be allocated among policyholders and
insurers per the insurance policies.
Example 2

basis. TRIA § 103(e)(8)(E). This discretion is limited by the repayment schedules found in the
Reauthorization Act of 2007. Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(2)(B). See notes 247-249
below.
245
TRIA § 103(e)(8).
246
TRIA § 103(e)(8)(A). Insurers must collect the surcharge amount from policyholders
and remit to the Secretary. TRIA § 103(e)(8)(C).
247
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(1)(B).
248
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(1)(B).
249
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(1)(B). The Secretary must issue rules pertaining
to the procedure to be used for collecting mandatory recoupment by on or about April 24,
2008.
250
TRIA § 103(e)(8)(C), as amended by Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(e)(2)(A).
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In 2010, a terrorist attack causes $150 million of insured losses. There
are 20 insurers impacted, and their direct earned premium is $2 billion.
Trigger:
Deductible:
Insurer Co-Pay:
Federal Co-Pay:
Total Insurer Loss:

Satisfied (> $100 million loss)
$400 million (20% of direct earned premium)
$0
$0
$150 million

Since the deductible is greater than the insured loss, the insurers and their
policyholders will bear the full cost of the losses.
Example 3
In 2010, a terrorist attack causes $2.5 billion of insured losses. There are
50 insurers impacted, and their direct earned premium is $10 billion.
Trigger:
Deductible:
Insurer Co-Pay:
Federal Co-Pay:
Total Insurer Loss:

Satisfied (> $100 million loss)
$2,000 million (20% of direct earned premium)
$75 million (15% of losses in excess of deductible)
$425 million (85% of losses in excess of deductible)
$2,075 million

The aggregate retention is the lesser of the aggregate amount, for all
insurers, of insured losses and the statutory amount of $27.5 billion. In this
case, the aggregate retention is $2.5 billion. The mandatory recoupment is the
positive difference between the aggregate retention, $2.5 billion, and the
aggregate uncompensated insurer loss, $2.075 billion. The government recoups
its payment of $425 million plus 33 percent. Based on the schedule in the
Program, the mandatory recoupment must be collected by September 30, 2012.
Example 4
This example shows how the Program works in the case of a large, megacatastrophic event. In 2010, a terrorist attack causes $40 billion of insured
losses. There are 100 insurers impacted, and their direct earned premium is $30
billion.
Trigger:
Deductible:
Insurer Co-Pay:
Federal Co-Pay:
Total Insurer Loss:

Satisfied (> $100 million loss)
$6 billion (20% of direct earned premium)
$5.1 million (15% of losses in excess of deductible)
$28.9 billion (85% of losses in excess of deductible)
$11.1 billion

The aggregate retention is $27.5 billion. The mandatory recoupment is
$16.4 billion, and the remainder of the government payment of $12.5 billion is
subject to discretionary recoupment. The following chart shows the breakdown
of payments and recoupments.
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CHART 1
Insured
Losses
$40 billion

Aggregate
Retention
$27.5 billion

Discretionary
Recoupment
$12.5 billion
Federal 85%
$28.9 billion

Insurer 15%
$5.1 billion

Mandatory
Recoupment
$16.4 billion

Insurer Deductible: $6 billion

[H]

Reinsurance and Excess Recovery

The Program does not limit or prevent insurers from obtaining
reinsurance coverage for insurer deductibles or insured losses retained by
insurers (the insurer’s co-share).251 Reinsurance coverage for these losses does
not affect the calculation of deductibles and retentions.252 Federal payment is
not reduced by reinsurance payment to an insurer, except that such reinsurance
payment and the federal payment may not exceed the aggregate amount of the
insurer’s insured loss for such a period. 253 Any such excess amount, to the
extent not covered in the reinsurance agreement as a recoupment by the
reinsurer, must be returned to the Secretary.
More generally, the sum of federal payment and the insurer’s recoveries
for insured losses from other sources cannot be greater than the insurer’s
aggregate losses for acts of terrorism in the Program Year.254 In other words,
the insurer cannot make a windfall from an act of terrorism. Compensation
provided by other federal programs can be considered duplicative payment and
thus subject to offset. These programs include: (1) disaster relief and
emergency assistance by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, (2)
block grant assistance by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
(3) and federal programs specially established to compensate victims for losses
resulting from certified act of terrorism (similar to the September 11th Victim

251

TRIA § 103(g)(1).
TRIA § 103(g)(1).
253
TRIA § 103(g)(2).
254
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Claims Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 39296, 39300
(June 29, 2004) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
252
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Compensation Fund). 255 But there is no offset for Social Security disability
payments and other similar benefits, which are entitlements to individuals as a
result of service performed and are paid irrespective of whether the loss occurs
as a result of an act of terrorism.256
[I]

Insurer’s Disclosure

The insurer must provide “clear and conspicuous disclosure” to
policyholders of the premium charged for terrorism coverage and the federal
share of compensation for insured losses under the Program.257 For any policy
issued after the enactment of the Reauthorization Act of 2007, the insurer must
provide a “clear and conspicuous disclosure to the policyholder of the
existence of the [$100 billion] cap . . . at the time of offer, purchase, and
renewal of the policy.”258 The last section of this chapter reproduces forms
drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that provide
model disclosure.259
The disclosure requirement is only for the benefit of policyholders. There
is no requirement that insurers provide disclosures to other parties, including
mortgage finance providers.260
[J]

Administration

Payment under the Program requires that a policyholder suffers an
insured loss and files a claim with the insurer.261 The insurer must process the
claim in accordance with ordinary business practices and any rules of the
Secretary.262 To make a claim under the Program, the insurer must submit to
the Secretary a claim for payment, written certification of the underlying claim
and all payment made for insured losses, and certification of its compliance
with the Secretary’s rules.263
255

Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Claims Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 39296, 39301
(June 29, 2004) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).

256

Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Claims Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 39296, 39301
(June 29, 2004) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
257
TRIA § 103(b)(2).
258
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4(d)(2).
259
See § 191.05 below.
260
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Disclosures and Mandatory Availability
Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 59720, 59722 (Oct. 17, 2003) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part
50).
261

TRIA § 103(b)(1).
TRIA § 103(b)(3).
263
TRIA § 103(b)(4). Advanced payments are possible, but the insurer must certify that
the payments will be distributed to policyholders within five business days of receipt of funds,
and that any interest earned on such funds will be remitted to the Treasury. Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program; Claims Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 39296, 39298 (June 29, 2004) (to be
codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
262
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The Secretary administers the Program, and is vested with the power to
issue interim and final rules and procedures for such administration. 264 The
Secretary also has the power to assess a civil monetary penalty against any
insurer that the Secretary determines has failed to charge, collect or remit
terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, has intentionally provided the
Secretary false information regarding premium or loss amount, has submitted a
fraudulent claim under the Program, or has otherwise failed to comply with
rules and regulations.265 Such monetary penalty is the greater of $1 million or,
in the case of any failure to pay, charge, collect, or remit amounts in
accordance with the Program, such amount in dispute.266 Also, the Secretary
has the power to subsequently adjust compensations, or require repayment of
any compensation previously awarded.267
[K]

Litigation Management

Upon the determination of an act of terrorism by the Secretary, the
Program creates an exclusive federal cause of action for “property damage,
personal injury, or death arising out of or resulting from such act of
terrorism.” 268 The Program preempts all state law causes of action “for
property damage, personal injury, or death.”269 The substantive law, however,
is derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the state in
which such act of terrorism occurred.270 The procedures and rules issued by the
Secretary under 31 C.F.R. § 50.82, as in effect on the date of issuance in final
form, shall apply to any cause of action brought under the Program.271
By 90 days after a certified act of terrorism, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation must designate one or more U.S. District Court that
“shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions for any claim
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) relating to
or arising out of an act of terrorism.”272 This assignment should be based on
the convenience of the parties and the just and efficient conduct of proceedings.
For the purpose of personal jurisdiction, the assigned district court is deemed
to sit in all judicial districts of the United States.273

264

TRIA §§ 103(a)(2), 104; 31 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2007).
TRIA §104(e)(1).
266
TRIA §104(e)(2).
267
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Claims Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 39296, 39298
(June 29, 2004) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 50).
265

268

TRIA § 107(a)(1). The litigation management provisions apply only to actions that
arise out of or result from acts of terrorism that occurred during the effective period of the
Program. TRIA § 107(e).
269
TRIA § 107(a)(2).
270
TRIA § 107(a)(3).
271
Extension Act of 2005 § 7.
272
TRIA § 107(a)(4).
273
TRIA § 107(a)(4).
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Lastly, the United States has the right of subrogation with respect to any
payment made under the Program.274
[L]

Study and Reporting Requirements

TRIA mandated that the Secretary study and report to Congress whether
adequate and affordable catastrophic reinsurance for acts of terrorism is
available to life insurers that issue group life insurance, and whether terrorism
risk affects the availability of life insurance and other insurance products,
including personal lines.275 The Extension Act of 2005 did not add any other
lines of products to the Program, but instead excluded commercial automobile
insurance, burglary and theft insurance, surety insurance, professional liability
insurance, and farm owners multiple peril insurance. 276 Nor did the
Reauthorization Act of 2007 include additional lines or products to the
Program coverage.
However, the Extension Act of 2005 mandated that the President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets perform an analysis of the long-term
availability and affordability of insurance for terrorism risk, including group
life and coverage for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological events
(“NBC” risk). 277 The President’s Working Group submitted this report in
September 2006, and it concluded, among other things, that there has been
little if any disruption of the group life market since September 11 and that
there has been little development in the market for NBC risk. 278 Thus, the
TRIA Program does not now include group life insurance and it does not
provide coverage for nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological events.
The report also concluded that since September 11, the insurance market
substantially improved in the financial health of the insurance industry and the
delivery of terrorism coverage to the market. But the report expressed
uncertainty on the potential long-term development of the terrorism risk
insurance market.
The Reauthorization Act of 2007 mandates that the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets continue to analyze the long-term availability and
affordability of the market for terrorism risk.279 The Group must submit reports
in September 2010 and 2013, the year before sunset of the Program.
The Reauthorization Act of 2007 also mandates that the Comptroller
General of the United States must examine the availability and affordability of
insurance coverage for losses caused by terrorist attacks involving NBC risks,
and the capacity of the private market to manage these risks.280
274

TRIA § 107(c).
TRIA § 103(h)-(i).
276
Extension Act of 2005 § 3(b)(1)(C).
277
Extension Act of 2005 § 8.
278
Terrorism Risk Insurance: Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets at 80 (Sept. 2006), available at www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financialinstitution/terrorism-insurance/pdf/report.pdf (last visited on Mar. 24, 2008).
279
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 5(c).
280
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 5(a). This report is due no later than one year after the
enactment of the statute. The Comptroller is also required to submit a study to determine
275
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Collectively, these study and reporting requirements will continue to
inform Congress of the evolving nature of terrorism risk and its effects on the
insurance market and economy. Moreover, they will play a significant role in
the government’s decision to terminate, continue or modify the Program in the
future.
[M]

Summary of TRIA and Amendment Changes

The following table presents some of the major changes as the Program
evolved from TRIA to its two amendments, the Extension Act of 2005 and the
Reauthorization Act of 2007.
TABLE 1
TRIA

2005 Act

2007 Act

Duration

2002 (transition year)
2003 to 2005

2006 to 2007

2008 to 2014

Excluded Lines

Crop, private mortgage,
medical malpractice, health
and life, financial guarantee,
flood, reinsurance

Same but added to exclusions
commercial auto,
professional liability, surety,
burglary and theft, and farm
owners multiperil

Same

Act of Terrorism

"foreign person or interest"
requirement

Same

Included domestic terrorism

Trigger

None

2006: $50 million
2007: $100 million

$100 million

Deductible

2003: 7 percent
2004: 10 percent
2005: 15 percent

2006: 17.5 percent
2007: 20 percent

20 percent for all years

Federal Co-Share

90 percent

2006: 90 percent
2007: 85 percent

85 percent for all years

Cap

$100 billion

Same

Same

Recoupment

Mandatory recoupment of
difference between $15
billion and aggregate
retention; surcharge of 3
percent per year

Changed aggregate retention
figures
2006:
$25 billion
2007: $27.5 billion

Aggregate retention $27.5
billion for all years; fixed
timetables for recovery of
mandatory recoupment; 133
percent multiplier to
mandatory recoupment

§ 191.04
[A]

TRIA and Beyond: Policy Considerations
Insurance Industry Strategy

Since the enactment of TRIA, the strategy of the insurance industry has
been clear. A federal co-share agreement provides subsidized insurance at the
whether there are specific markets in the United States where there are “unique capacity
constraints on the amount of terrorism risk insurance available.” Reauthorization Act of 2007
§ 5(b). This report was due on or about April 24, 2008.
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extreme end of terrorism risk. The Program has evolved since 2002. Under the
Extension Act of 2005 and the Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Program has
shifted a greater share of the burden to the insurance industry: a loss trigger
was introduced; deductibles, co-pay percentage, and aggregate retention
amounts have increased. These mechanisms ensure that most ordinary acts of
terrorism are covered mostly, if not all, by the private sectors among
policyholders and their insurers. This makes sense because the insurance
industry can underwrite these types of losses in the same way as other
insurable fortuitous risks. The loss from a car bomb should be just as insurable,
without extraordinary governmental assistance, as the loss from an engineering
failure in a structure. That the private sector would assume most ordinary acts
of terrorism was the assumption of the “make available” requirement of the
Program. However, when there are extreme events such as September 11, the
Program assumes a great portion of the losses up to the cap. Some payments
are ultimately paid back in the form of a mandatory recoupment, but the
remaining payment need not be recouped.
Since some payments may not be recouped, and since the Program does
not charge an ex ante premium for participation, the Program provides
subsidized reinsurance. In effect, the government provides free capital.
From the insurer’s perspective, there is no reason to discontinue the
Program since the provision of free capital is always a good thing. Lobbying
efforts by both the insurance industry and the business community resulted in
extensions of the Program in 2005 and again in 2007. There is no reason to
believe that the same incentives will not come to bear in 2014 when the
Reauthorization Act of 2007 is set to expire. Although TRIA was enacted “to
allow for a transition period for the private markets to stabilize,” the Program
has gone from a temporary program (originally envisioned for three years) to a
long-term, public-private partnership (12 years). There is nothing to suggest
that the insurance industry, now or in the future, will shun free reinsurance
coverage for extreme risk.
[B]

Difficulties of Assessing Terrorism Risk

The argument for a federal reinsurance program essentially stems from
the difficulty in assessing terrorism. If acts of terrorism were predictable in the
same vein as auto accidents or home fires, there would be no argument for
government intervention. The risk can be efficiently allocated between insurer
and policyholder, and these parties should internalize the cost of terrorism. The
problem is the great uncertainty associated with terrorism risk.
September 11th presented an information shock on two levels. First, the
insurance industry learned that diversification of business lines does not
necessarily reduce the risk. The attacks affected 23 different product lines,
including property and casualty, life and health, liability, aviation, business
interruption, and workers compensation. Second, and more profoundly, the
severity of the loss exceeded any expectations or linear extrapolations from
previous data, and losses from catastrophic terrorism could exceed those of
extreme natural catastrophes. Without a mechanism to assess the risks and
reserve against anticipated losses, terrorism risk could become a black hole of
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liability. These considerations pose the question of whether the risk is
quantified in an actuarial sense and so can be priced. Because the keystone
concept in insurance is the law of large numbers, insurance works best when
frequency is high and severity is relatively low, e.g., auto and home insurance.
When frequency is low and severity is high, as is the case in both man-made
and natural catastrophes, assessibility of risk is problematic and insurability is
tested at the extremities.
Two primary arguments have been made to suggest that terrorism risk is
unique, and therefore should be a subject to a government compensation
program. First, the risk can be extreme. Second, it is unpredictable in the sense
that the risk is not capable of assessment.
September 11 was a paradigm shifting event because it showed that acts
of terrorism can cause extreme losses, equaling or exceeding the worst natural
catastrophes. But this fact alone is not so compelling to justify government
subsidized reinsurance. Terrorism is similar to natural catastrophes in that it is
random and involves low frequency, potentially high severity. Only a few
spectacular acts will cause widespread losses. In this regard, terrorism is very
much like natural catastrophes. In the context of the twentieth century,
September 11 was a 1/100 year event. In recent history, only Hurricane
Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina were comparable to
September 11 in terms of scale of insurance losses.281 Indeed, large natural
catastrophes are more likely to occur than similar scale terrorist acts, and over
the course of many years the aggregate loss from large scale natural
catastrophes will most probably inflict greater losses. Yet no one has suggested
that the insurance industry should not cover natural catastrophes or that losses
from these events are uninsurable.
While the losses from September 11 were extreme, it is important to note
that the event did not truly test the solvency of the industry. Whereas
Hurricane Andrew resulted in the bankruptcies of 12 small insurers, 282
September 11 did not have the same effect on the industry. Few, if any,
insurers became troubled as a result of the losses. Reinsurers absorbed a bulk
of the losses, and since September 11, the insurance industry has recapitalized
and the financial health of sector is now stronger than it was then.
The probabilities are that a natural catastrophe is more likely to threaten
the solvency of the industry. Consider, for example, the tsunami that struck
South Asia on December 26, 2004, killing approximately 280,000 people. The
afflicted regions were underdeveloped, and there was shallow penetration of
insurance, which is indicative of less developed economies.283 These types of
natural catastrophes are not limited to poor countries. There is a tangible
possibility that such a similar scale event will occur in California or the Pacific
Northwest. With only a substantial fraction of the lives lost as compared to the
281

See Crippen, note 3 above, at 9.

282

Christopher M. Lewis & Peter O. Davis, Capital Market Instruments for Financing
Catastrophe Risk: New Directions?, 17 J. Ins. Reg. 110, 113 (1998).
283

See Christian Brauner, Swiss Re, Tsunami in South Asia: Building Financial
Protection 7 (2005) (“However, due to the very low insurance density, the insured losses will
be relatively low compared to the overall scale of the losses suffered.”).
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South Asia tsunami, many property and casualty and life insurers may become
troubled as a result of the massive losses that would ensue. Thus, the greatest
risk of exogenous shock to the industry is from a natural mega-catastrophe.284
Terrorism risk can be extreme, but no more so than the risk of many
different kinds of natural catastrophes that can strike a major urban or
commercial area where there is a concentration of insured interests. The
argument that terrorism risk is so fundamentally different and thus uninsurable
is in truth self-serving, and reflects more lobbying strategy than actuarial
reality. “Terrorism coverage may be quantitatively different, but it is not
qualitatively different.”285
With respect to assessibility, it has been suggested that the “biggest—
perhaps virtually insurmountable—problem with terrorism risk is that very
limited historical data are available on terrorist attacks, and because terrorism
threat is dynamic, even the available historical data are less relevant in
predicting future incidents in the case of terrorism than natural catastrophes.”
286
The pricing of premium presupposes the sufficient quantification of risk.
The informational challenge is great. The industry needs to collect, analyze and
schematize data into a working model of frequency and severity, methods of
terrorism, weaknesses in the national security system, geographic location,
political risk, and international developments as well as individual risks and
vulnerability of policyholders.
But here again the problem is not insurmountable. Most types of natural
catastrophes, like hurricanes and earthquakes, are limited to particular
geographic areas. And, most types of catastrophic terrorism are limited to areas
of large concentration of value. This means major cities and commercial
centers. Patterns of terrorism already are evident in the data. Terrorism risk is
claimed to be different from natural catastrophes because it can strike
anywhere as opposed to the geographic limitation of some natural
catastrophes.287 But even the most cursory review of the unrefined data shows
that 8 of the top 10 costliest catastrophes struck London, New York, and the
airline industry. Below is a table showing the top 10 most costly terrorist
attacks.288
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TABLE 2
Losses

Victims

Date

Event

Country

WTC and Pentagon attacks
Bombing of NatWest tower
Bombing in Manchester
WTC garage bombing
Bombing in London
Bombing of Colombo Airport
Bombing of London’s Docklands
Bombing in Oklahoma City
PanAm bombing over Lockerbie
Three planes hijacked, bombed

US
UK
UK
US
UK
Sri Lanka
UK
US
UK
Jordan

(US$ M)

19,000
907
744
725
671
398
259
145
138
127

3000
1
-6
3
20
2
166
270
--

9/11/01
4/24/93
6/15/96
2/26/93
4/10/92
7/24/01
2/9/96
4/19/95
12/21/88
9/17/70

Costly acts of terrorism, of the kind that is violent or dangerous to person
or property, presupposes concentration of high value, insured interests, which
are found in large cities and commercial centers. In the past, commercial
airlines have been targeted because security was soft, commercial jets are
expensive assets, and the aircraft provides a natural hostage setting. That
London and New York have been historical targets is not surprising since they
are major population and commercial centers, as well as symbols of Western
political and economic power. The attack against the Pentagon during
September 11 and the Oklahoma City bombing are connected in that both
attacks targeted the United States government. Collectively, these simple
observations explain the historical data.
This is not to suggest that acts of terrorism will follow historical trends.
As discussed earlier, it is foreseeable that terrorism will evolve to inflict new
types of risks and losses, including economic and electronic terrorism.
However, the important point is that, for the purposes of the insurance industry,
catastrophic terrorism presupposes a concentration of high value, insurable
interests. Viewed in this way, assessment is not an insurmountable task. Just
like natural catastrophes, which are limited to large swaths of geographic areas
like Florida and California, high value economic targets tend to be
concentrated in geographic areas, whether they be cities, industrial zones,
certain industries, or specific assets. The tragedy of September 11 has many
dimensions, but one striking aspect is that high value economic targets such as
New York and the World Trade Center were considered “soft” targets. With
the realization that terrorists have targeted high value economic assets, security
around those assets has increased significantly. Many of these properties are no
longer “soft” targets. Major cities, ports of entry, and economic assets like
factories, dams, and skyscrapers have increased their security. These assets are
less risky now.
Since September 11, there has not been another terrorist attack, big or
small, in the geographic United States. During this time, the insurance industry
has recovered much of its losses through the premiums charged to cover
terrorism risk. No one knows when the next terrorist strike will occur, perhaps
this year or perhaps ten years from now, but when it occurs there certainly
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would have been many years of premium collection and the building up of
reserves. Whether that reserve is sufficient to pay the loss is unknown, but this
is also a part of the business of insurance—no one ever promised the insurance
industry a guaranteed profit under the guise of the law of large numbers. The
fundamental business of insurance is to assume risk.
There will never be a day in which terrorism risk can be calculated to an
actuarial certainty like auto or life insurance. Significant uncertainty will
always surround terrorism risk. But it is a mistake to believe that uncertainty
equates to inassessibility.
[C]

Effect of Subsidized Insurance on the Market

In the opinion of this author, the involvement of the government presents
significant questions of fairness and efficiency. 289 The advantages of
government involvement are apparent. After the initial price dislocations in the
immediate aftermath of September 11, the “take up” rate of terrorism coverage
has gone up to 64 percent in the first half of 2007.290 Premium rates have also
declined. In 2006, terrorism coverage constituted 4.2 percent of the premium
for the overall property and casualty premium. 291 This constitutes
approximately $47 per $1 million of total insured value.
However, there is a significant caveat to these positive pricing trends.
Although the amendments to TRIA imposed greater share of financial
responsibility on insurers and policyholders, the pricing continued to decline.
This indicates that “competition has held down premium increases.” 292
Competition in the industry increases as the industry has more capital.
Insurance is a cyclical business, with price levels ebbing and flowing with the
supply of capital. Since September 11, capital has flowed into the insurance
industry. With a greater supply of capital, insurers will feel a need to provide
terrorism risk coverage, whether there is or is not a Federal reinsurance.
Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office concludes: “In the absence of a
federal mandate, insurers have a strong incentive to offer terrorism coverage to
their commercial customers because to do otherwise risks their losing business
on other property and casualty line.”293 Presumably, they would lose business
because in a competitive market, such as the insurance market, there would be
a competitor who would provide terrorism coverage to gain another insurer’s
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customer. Thus, there might be a sufficient availability of terrorism coverage
even without the Program.294
Because extreme risk is mitigated dramatically, insurers can underwrite
terrorism with the knowledge that an act of terrorism will most likely not cause
insolvency or otherwise threaten the existence of the firm. Given the rarity of
terrorism on the American homeland, and the more remote possibility given
the added security measures in a post-September 11 world, the provision of
terrorism coverage, which mortgage financiers require in the provision of
credit, is a highly profitable venture. In years 2002 to 2004, estimates of
terrorism risk premiums were $700 million, $2.3 billion, and $2.7 billion,
respectively.295 Obviously, these premiums do not make up for the $36 billion
loss of September 11, but over the course of several more years, without
further claims, the loss would be made up.
Moreover, the financial health of the insurance industry currently is good.
At the end of 2006, the property and casualty insurers’ net worth was $487
billion, which is greater than their pre-September 11 levels. This surplus level
was achieved despite large losses associated with Hurricanes Charley, Frances,
Ivan, Jeanne and Katrina in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, the industry benefited
from an underwriting gain of $31 billion, and had net profits of $64 billion.296
In sum, since September 11, premiums for terrorism coverage have
declined, and the take up rate of terrorism coverage has increased. Certainly,
the Program had a significant effect. The Program mandates that insurers
“make available” terrorism coverage, and the existence of the federal
reinsurance program assures that premiums are no different from that of other
coverages. Given this structure, the insurance industry has benefitted
substantially. Terrorism risk coverage has provided substantial underwriting
profit, which would also result in substantial investment profits.
[D]

Problems of Subsidized Risk

In the opinion of this author, it is fairly clear that government subsidized
insurance has a net negative effect in terms of fairness and efficiency. As the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concludes, “TRIA does not lower the total
costs of terrorism risk but rather shifts more of the burden from commercial
property owners and their tenants to taxpayers.”297 The Program does not have
a cost reducing effect, which would result in a net benefit for society, but is
instead a wealth transferring apparatus that shifts some of the cost of the
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activities of well funded, profitable industries such as insurance, commercial
real estate, and finance to the American taxpayer.
There is no question that the insurance industry and the business
community can bear the full cost of terrorism. September 11 was a paradigm
shifting, cataclysmic event in the annals of insurance and terrorism histories.
Yet, the insurance industry readily absorbed the loss. 298 Currently, the net
worth of insurers writing commercial lines covered by the Program is about
$187 billion, and thus this amount is still sufficient to cover a $100 billion total
exposure under the Program.299 Certainly, a $100 billion hit to capital from a
terrorist attack several multiples greater than September 11 would be
devastating, but such an event would not result in a systemic failure of the
insurance industry,300 which should be the benchmark for determining whether
governmental intervention is warranted or not.
If the private sector of insurers and commercial policyholders can absorb
a multi-billion dollar loss, then the only justification for government
intervention is to shift the cost from businesses and insurers to American
taxpayers. This raises problems of fairness and efficiency.
As to fairness, the issue is evident. There is no reason why American
taxpayers should partially fund the cost of business activity when there is no
net social gain from such subsidization. In other words, since subsidization
does not reduce the overall level of losses expected from terrorist acts—i.e.,
terrorists would not be deterred because there is a cost shifting mechanism in
place—the cost of terrorism must be born by the insurer, policyholder, or
American taxpayer. Given this reality, one must ask why the American
taxpayer should subsidize the cost of business activity when the insurers and
policyholders are capable of assuming the costs, though the cost could be
unpleasant under some scenarios.
As far as efficiency, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the
enactment of the Program is not cost neutral, i.e., the Program does not affect
the total amount of the anticipated cost of terrorism. Rather, the Program is
inefficient in that it may increase the cost of terrorism. If an activity does not
fully internalize its cost, the externalization of some of the cost results in
inefficient behavior. A tangible example can be given. Assume that a
commercial developer has a choice of two architectural designs: Design A is a
state of the art glass office tower structure, which is highly susceptible to an
298
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attack from a truck bomb; Design B is a more generic structure made of
concrete and reinforced steel. Or, consider a choice of location: Location A is a
highly desirable urban location that is dense with high value properties;
Location B is a suburban location that is low risk for a terrorism strike. If the
cost of procuring terrorism coverage is risk based and fully incorporates the
choice of design, the commercial developer must consider the added cost of
insurance associated with Design A and Location A. On the other hand, if
some of the insurance cost is subsidized by a third party, then the reduction in
cost adversely factors into the developer’s choice of architectural design and
location. In these everyday choices, businesses can opt to avoid or mitigate
risks, though such avoidance or mitigation may result in costs such as loss of
aesthetics, convenience, or financial costs. The more risky choice increases the
cost of terrorism, and yet a subsidized insurance program may actually
incentivize risky behavior, thus increasing overall cost.
These examples illustrate a fundamental problem of government
insurance subsidies. 301 More importantly, it is not an abstract hypothetical.
There is evidence that the effect described above is taking hold in the market.
Again, the CBO notes that “[a]n abundance of evidence suggests that
commercial policyholders as a group are not taking significant steps to avoid
or mitigate terrorism risks associated with their existing properties.” 302 In
addition to a failure to avoid or mitigate risk, there is evidence of undesirable
risk-taking. The CBO also notes that “TRIA’s subsidies also appear to dampen
the inclination of firms to relocate their operations away from high-risk areas,”
thus reducing the risk of exposure.303 Compounding this problem is the fact
that as a result of subsidized insurance “[p]olicyholders generally do not
receive explicit discounts on their terrorism insurance premiums for taking
specific mitigation steps.”304 Thus, there is substantial reason to believe, based
on policy analysis and empirical observation, that the Program ultimately
increases the cost of terrorism.305
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The evidence suggests that even without the Program, terrorism risk
coverage would be available in the market. Such insurance may and probably
would be more expensive without a federal reinsurance program, but the cost is
a matter that would be allocated between the two principal private market
actors, the insurer and the policyholder. As between them, the cost is zero sum:
the policyholder would pay more premiums, but eventually the insurer may
end up having paid a greater cost. The cost is fully borne by the activity, and if
the cost is deemed too high such that the activity is foregone, it is reasonable to
conclude that the activity, on the whole, should not be initiated, which would
be the result under a fully internalized cost structure. As seen, however, the
Program provides government subsidy of extreme risk. When an activity does
not fully internalize its cost and some cost is externalized, there is an adverse
effect. Inefficiency may result, meaning a greater total cost, though much of
this is dispersed to a greater number of cost bearers (i.e., American taxpayers)
in a way that the original risk bearers (i.e., insurers and policyholders) profit
from the subsidization. This scheme would then raise substantial issues of
fairness.
In 2014, when the Program is once again set to expire, the government
will once again have the opportunity to weigh these considerations. One option
would be to eliminate the Program altogether. Another option could be to
incorporate an ex ante premium. The Congressional Budget Office has
calculated that premiums for the reinsurance program, if charged, would have
had a value of approximately $850 million in 2006 and 2007, respectively.306 It
is odd that the government has chosen not to charge these premiums, or at least
hold these premiums as a potential offset to recoupment under the Program.
Another option could be to dramatically raise the trigger amount to the level of
loss that would in fact cause a systemic failure of the insurance market.
Presumably, this trigger would be far greater than the current trigger of $100
million, perhaps by 2014 a trigger amount in the order of $50 billion or even
greater.
One must bear in mind that the public’s (and therefore the government’s)
concern is not the preservation of the insurance industry’s or policyholder’s
profits, but is instead a systemic failure of the economic system. In other words,
the effects, whether positive or negative, of a private contractual arrangement
between two sophisticated parties should not concern the American public or
politicians. If there is a loss or higher cost among them, they should assume
that effect as part of doing their business. It is only when their activity affects
third-parties, who are not parties to the contract and have not or cannot
negotiate for the disposition of such effects, as would be the case in a systemic
failure of the insurance industry, does the matter rise to one of public concern,
for such failure would adversely affect everyone. In this regard, the trigger
amount should reflect the level of loss that would endanger an entire industry
as opposed to inflict losses on the industry or endanger a few insurers or
policyholders who ex post may have made bad choices. From this perspective,
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a $100 million trigger is a tiny amount. The history of natural catastrophes,
particularly in the 1990s and the twenty-first century, shows that multi-billion
dollar losses are now quite routine.
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§ 191.05

Disclosure Forms

On December 19, 2007, the Property and Casualty Insurance Committee
and the Terrorism Insurance Implementation Working Group of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted the Model Disclosure
Forms.307 The Treasury Department worked with the Committee and the NAIC
Working Group to assure that the disclosures satisfy the revised disclosure
requirements in the Act.308 Following are versions of Form 1 and Form 2 that
were current as of this writing in early 2008.
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[A]

NAIC Form 1 ─ Policyholder Disclosure Notice of
Terrorism Insurance Coverage
POLICYHOLDER DISCLOSURE
NOTICE OF TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE

You are hereby notified that under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, as amended, that you
have a right to purchase insurance coverage for losses resulting from acts of terrorism, as
defined in Section 102(1) of the Act: The term “act of terrorism” means any act that is certified
by the Secretary of the Treasury—in concurrence with the Secretary of State, and the Attorney
General of the United States—to be an act of terrorism; to be a violent act or an act that is
dangerous to human life, property, or belowstructure; to have resulted in damage within the
United States, or outside the United States in the case of certain air carriers or vessels or the
premises of a United States mission; and to have been committed by an individual or
individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to
influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.
YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WHERE COVERAGE IS PROVIDED BY THIS POLICY
FOR LOSSES RESULTING FROM CERTIFIED ACTS OF TERRORISM, SUCH LOSSES
MAY BE PARTIALLY REIMBURSED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
UNDER A FORMULA ESTABLISHED BY FEDERAL LAW. HOWEVER, YOUR POLICY
MAY CONTAIN OTHER EXCLUSIONS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT YOUR COVERAGE,
SUCH AS AN EXCLUSION FOR NUCLEAR EVENTS. UNDER THE FORMULA, THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT GENERALLY REIMBURSES 85% OF COVERED
TERRORISM
LOSSES
EXCEEDING
THE
STATUTORILY
ESTABLISHED
DEDUCTIBLE PAID BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY PROVIDING THE COVERAGE.
THE PREMIUM CHARGED FOR THIS COVERAGE IS PROVIDED BELOW AND DOES
NOT INCLUDE ANY CHARGES FOR THE PORTION OF LOSS THAT MAY BE
COVERED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE ACT.
YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT, AS
AMENDED, CONTAINS A $100 BILLION CAP THAT LIMITS U.S. GOVERNMENT
REIMBURSEMENT AS WELL AS INSURERS’ LIABILITY FOR LOSSES RESULTING
FROM CERTIFIED ACTS OF TERRORISM WHEN THE AMOUNT OF SUCH LOSSES
IN ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR EXCEEDS $100 BILLION. IF THE AGGREGATE
INSURED LOSSES FOR ALL INSURERS EXCEED $100 BILLION, YOUR COVERAGE
MAY BE REDUCED.
Acceptance or Rejection of Terrorism Insurance Coverage
I hereby elect to purchase terrorism coverage for a prospective premium of
$_____________.
I hereby decline to purchase terrorism coverage for certified acts of
terrorism. I understand that I will have no coverage for losses resulting from
certified acts of terrorism.
___________________________
Policyholder/Applicant’s Signature

___________________________
Insurance Company

___________________________
Print Name

___________________________
Policy Number

___________________________

Date
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[B]

NAIC Form 2 ─ Policyholder Disclosure Notice of
Terrorism Insurance Coverage (Includes Notice of Premium
Attributable to Terrorism Coverage)
POLICYHOLDER DISCLOSURE
NOTICE OF TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE

Coverage for acts of terrorism is included in your policy. You are hereby notified that under
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, as amended in 2007, the definition of act of terrorism has
changed. As defined in Section 102(1) of the Act: The term “act of terrorism” means any act
that is certified by the Secretary of the Treasury—in concurrence with the Secretary of State,
and the Attorney General of the United States—to be an act of terrorism; to be a violent act or
an act that is dangerous to human life, property, or belowstructure; to have resulted in damage
within the United States, or outside the United States in the case of certain air carriers or
vessels or the premises of a United States mission; and to have been committed by an
individual or individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the United
States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by
coercion. Under your coverage, any losses resulting from certified acts of terrorism may be
partially reimbursed by the United States Government under a formula established by the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, as amended. However, your policy may contain other
exclusions which might affect your coverage, such as an exclusion for nuclear events. Under
the formula, the United States Government generally reimburses 85% of covered terrorism
losses exceeding the statutorily established deductible paid by the insurance company
providing the coverage. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, as amended, contains a $100
billion cap that limits U.S. Government reimbursement as well as insurers’ liability for losses
resulting from certified acts of terrorism when the amount of such losses exceeds $100 billion
in any one calendar year. If the aggregate insured losses for all insurers exceed $100 billion,
your coverage may be reduced.
The portion of your annual premium that is attributable to coverage for acts of terrorism is
__________, and does not include any charges for the portion of losses covered by the United
States government under the Act.
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED THAT UNDER THE TERRORISM
RISK INSURANCE ACT, AS AMENDED, ANY LOSSES RESULTING FROM
CERTIFIED ACTS OF TERRORISM UNDER MY POLICY COVERAGE MAY BE
PARTIALLY REIMBURSED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, MAY BE
SUBJECT TO A $100 BILLION CAP THAT MAY REDUCE MY COVERAGE AND I
HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE PORTION OF MY PREMIUM ATTRIBUTABLE TO
SUCH COVERAGE.
____________________________
Policyholder/Applicant’s Signature

____________________________
Date

____________________________
Print Name

Name of Insurer: ____________________
Policy Number: _____________________
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